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ABSTRACT 
Controversy currently exists over whether abnormal returns (ARs) are earned by 
shareholders of bidder and target banks through a Merger and Acquisition (M&A). The 
state of the economy in which the firms operate is often mentioned as a reason for firms 
engaging in M&As, however, the extent to which economies influence the ARs of 
shareholders is unknown. Following MacKinlay (1997), the aim of this study is to 
determine the average ARs earned or lost by shareholders of several banks around the 
world during an M&A. The results obtained may indicate that shareholders of bidding 
firms consider an M&A to be a wealth-destroying event irrespective of the state of the 
economy. It would seem that target firms’ shareholders consider M&As to be wealth-
creating events when they occur during a period of real economic expansion. However, 
during periods of real economic contraction, target firms’ shareholders consider M&As to 
be wealth-destroying events. Thus, the state of an economy during an M&A can affect 
average ARs considerably.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are a popular strategic alternative to outsourcing, 
investing in financial instruments, leasing assets and internal growth (Lubatkin, 1983). 
M&As can be interpreted as external growth, while internal growth is considered to be 
the “integrating of internal resources and the raising of resource efficiency” (Qiusheng, 
Guanghui & Yunhua, 2006:1). Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) state 
that, during the 1977–1999 period, the mean size (average transaction value in millions of 
American Dollars [USD]) of M&As increased by 283%, with the number of bidding 
firms involved increasing considerably ‒ by 3,491%.  However, during the last few years, 
there have been fewer M&As owing to the global recession. In 2009, global M&A 
volume reached only USD 2.40 trillion, the lowest annual total since 2004 (Deallogic, 
2010). This represented a decrease of 24% from the USD 3.17 trillion recorded in 2008. 
Panel A of Figure 1.1 gives a breakdown of the 2009 figures per industry, with the 
financial industry contributing the most to the total (USD 418.9 billion). Panel B of 
Figure 1.1 represents a further breakdown of the 2009 figure showing the volume 
occurring per month, as well as the number of deals confirmed. Altunbas and Marques 
(2008) mention deregulation, shareholder activism, continual improvements in the level 
of information technology, and the globalisation and integration of financial markets, as 
possible reasons for the increase in the consolidations of financial firms. 
In view of the foregoing comments, there is considerable interest in M&As from the point 
of view that, since M&As occur frequently, there must be substantial gains that arise as 
there are many alternative investments a firm can undertake to improve performance and 
cash flow. In addition, such interest in M&As also occurs as such activity often causes 
short-run losses for bidding firms. Dodds and Quek (1985) mention that in Britain, when 
firms fail in merging with or acquiring other firms, these firms actually outperform the 
stock market index for twelve months after the failed attempt. Moeller, Schlingemann 
and Stulz (2005) found that mergers of American firms during the period 1980 to 2001 
had a detrimental effect on the bidders’ share price. 
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Figure 1.1: M&A volumes and values (2009) 
Panel A  Panel B 
 
 
Source: Deallogic Press Release, 2010 
While short-run losses are generally incurred by the shareholders of the bidding firms 
(including banks), there are exceptions. Bruner (2004) observes that Mattel’s share price 
increased to a significant extent when the company acquired Fisher-Price Toys. Eckbo 
(1983) interprets gains from M&As in the sense that the “control over the target firm’s 
resources enables the successful bidder to initiate a revaluation of its own (as well as the 
target’s) shares by implementing a higher-valued operating strategy” (Eckbo, 1983:241).  
While many authors have studied M&As, more research is needed given the controversy 
over whether M&As benefit shareholders participating in such deals and whether benefits 
or losses depend on the state of the economy. To date, research has not focused 
specifically on M&As in a recessionary economy, although several studies, such as 
Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007), have implicitly measured the economic gains 
associated with M&As in an expansionary economy. When examining the effect of 
M&As on the publicly traded debt and equity instruments of the firms involved, 
Maquieira, Megginson and Nail (1998) identify an event window during the 1963–1996 
period. Thus, their study covers periods of both economic expansion and contraction, but 
there is no indication of how the state of the economy affected the performance of these 
mergers. As such, conclusions cannot be drawn as to whether the a priori expectation of 
M&As (negative shareholder value is associated with the bidding firm and positive 
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shareholder value with target firm) applies to both expansionary and recessionary 
economies.  
In relation to banking M&A, Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007) found that large Western 
European banks sought relatively large and efficient Central and Eastern European banks 
(CEEC) with an established presence in their local retail banking markets. Altunbas and 
Marques (2008) found that bank mergers in the European Union benefitted shareholders 
of both the bidder and the target banks. Other articles that deal with banking M&As 
include James and Wier (1987), Delong (2001), Houston, James and Ryngaert (2001), 
Delong (2003a) and Karceski, Ongena and Smith (2005). 
This study analyses the effects on the shareholder wealth of the bidding and the target 
firms, considering different economic states, with bidding companies proposing mergers 
with target firms. Target firms are those acquired by bidders who succeed in acquiring the 
targets. Thus, when reference is made in the literature to a bidder, one cannot assume that 
the merger occurred, as that firm could have merely tendered or attempted to merge with 
the firm in a hostile manner via the market. A merger is considered to be a transaction 
between two juristic entities of similar size (using market capitalisation), whereas an 
acquisition is the purchase of one smaller entity by a larger entity. An acquisition is 
considered to be hostile when the target’s firm’s board of directors rejects the tabled offer 
from the bidder. This explanation is analogous to the definition used by the Financial 
Times (FT) and Goergen and Renneboog (2004). This study considers both bidder and 
target firms, as the economic results for each are often quite different, as explained by 
Delong (2001) and Karceski et al. (2005). The results of the bidding firm less the results 
of the target firm (aggregate return), as mentioned in Capron and Mitchell (1997), will 
not be considered because a large return earned by the target firm’s shareholders can 
offset a small loss for the bidding firm’s shareholders, thus distorting the relative effect of 
the M&A. The M&As that were sampled are split between periods of real economic 
expansion and contraction determined by the level of real Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). In line with McConnell and Brue (2005), real GDP is defined as the total market 
value of all goods and services produced within a country’s borders during a given time 
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period, deflated by an appropriate price index. Economic contraction is defined as two 
consecutive quarters of decline in real GDP in the bidder’s domicile. The converse 
applies to real economic expansion. Thus, an M&A is deemed to have occurred during a 
period of real economic expansion and contraction by determining the state of the 
economy of the bidder’s country, with the target country’s economic state being of no 
significance. Real growth, as opposed to nominal growth, is assessed in order to correct 
for inflationary effects on GDP.    
The study of shareholder gains during M&A activity can be extended to a test of market 
efficiency. In accordance with the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), “investors should 
not be able to earn above normal returns in the market , owing to the market operating 
with all pertinent information taken into account” (Von Gersdorff & Bacon, 2009:2). This 
study will implicitly test for Semi-Strong Market Efficiency (SSME) for American, 
French and Indian shares. Studies that test for EMH using the event study method include 
Samitas and Kenourgios (2004) and Von Gersdorff and Bacon (2009).  
The remainder of this study will comprise a discussion of the relevant literature 
concerning the reasons for M&As, the effect on shareholder wealth of these transactions 
and the various ways of measuring the effect being discussed. Chapter Three contains a 
description of the empirical analysis used, while Chapter Four comprises a discussion of 
the results obtained. Chapter Five concludes the study.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter contains a discussion of the literature dealing with the effects of M&As on 
shareholder wealth. The first section deals with relevant opinions on why firms conduct 
M&A activity, while the second section discusses academic opinions concerning the 
profitability of M&As. These opinions are split between those who consider M&As to be 
beneficial and those who consider them detrimental from both the bidder and the target 
shareholders perspective. The chapter concludes with a review of the various methods 
used to test for these effects.   
2.2 REASONS FOR M&As 
The exploitation of synergies between firms is often mentioned as a motive behind a 
firm’s decision to consolidate. Lubatkin (1983) explains this concept by stating that 
“synergy occurs when two operating units can be run more efficiently and/or more 
effectively (i.e. with a more appropriate allocation of scarce resources given 
environmental constraints) together than apart” (Lubatkin, 1983:218). Lubatkin (1983) 
mentions that three main sources of synergies exist: The first relates to technical 
economics, specifically the scale economies of a firm’s operations. These occur when a 
firm’s functions and processes are modified, causing the same size and quality of inputs 
to be applied in such as way as to produce a greater or better quality of goods and 
services. The second is that of diversification economics, which firms achieve by “a firm 
improving its performance relative to its risk attributes” (Lubatkin, 1983:219). The third 
source of synergy relates to pecuniary economics and is achieved through the price 
manipulation a firm with a sizeable market share can exert. Empirically, however, James 
and Wier (1987) find no significant relation between any gains to the bidding firm and 
changes in market structure due to an M&A.   
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When dealing with the opinions of managers whose companies (all North American with 
the sample period omitted) were currently involved in M&A activity, Walter and Barney 
(1990) found that the reasons for M&As occurring differed from those mentioned in the 
literature. Walter and Barney (1990) identify elements such as the diversifying of 
employment risk, the turnover of bad management through supervision by capital 
markets and the reflection of managerial hubris in M&As. Walter and Barney (1990) also 
found that firms may choose to merge with or acquire another firm in order to utilise the 
other firm’s financial strengths, such as a larger capacity to raise funds. These authors 
(Walter & Barney, 1990) reiterate the market controlling factor as a reason for firms 
engaging in M&As and state that the increase in competitiveness that comes with growth 
in a firm’s market share in a specific industry can often entice managers to engage in 
M&As. Thus, by buying competitors out, factors like price undercutting, “customer 
poaching”, or product manipulation are mitigated.  Zhang (1995) found that the benefits 
related to geographical diversification can lead to banks participating in M&A activity. 
These benefits include the ability of a firm to diversify its revenue base allowing the firm 
to insure itself against any economic or operating downturn in one particular area.  
Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997) found that banks consolidate because of the 
associated increase in operating profit. This can arise in several ways such as an 
improvement in cost efficiency related to the reduction in costs of the inputs required to 
produce a specific set of outputs. Zhang (1995) found that the efficiency gains associated 
with an M&A are sensitive to bank size characteristics, with shareholder gains being 
more pronounced after relatively small M&As. Other factors include an improvement in 
the profit efficiency that deals with the different combination of inputs and outputs 
associated with the firm’s processes or increasing the market power a firm enjoys thus 
allowing the firm to dictate prices and extract more profit. This advantage is analogous to 
that mentioned by Lubatkin (1983).   
Another reason for firms seeking consolidation is that a firm may require faster and 
cheaper growth than would be achieved if they attempted to build the infrastructure 
themselves. Delaney and Wamurizi (2004) found that corporate growth can be achieved 
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at a faster rate through the acquisition of, or merger with, another firm, rather than 
through internal growth in an organisation. In other words, growth in a company can 
occur more easily and quickly when a target firm is acquired that is already well 
established in a certain sector or market. This point is reiterated by Walter and Barney 
(1990) who found that one of the aims of M&As is to “reduce the risk and costs of 
diversifying products and services to customers within an industry” (Walter & Barney, 
1990:80). Delaney and Wamurizi (2004) mention that the scarcity of technological, 
financial and human resources in a firm is a motivating factor for M&As. If a firm has 
limited resources, the acquisition of another firm possessing these resources makes more 
sense in terms of time and cost saved than trying to develop them within the company.  
Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007) studied European banking M&As and found that a 
firm merges with or acquires another firm due to the enhanced efficiency and profitability 
the M&A creates for the acquirer. Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007) also state that a firm 
merges with or acquires another firm to increase its market power. The enhanced 
efficiency and greater market power objectives are consistent with Lubatkin (1983), 
Walter and Barney (1990), Zhang (1995), Pilloff (1996) and Akhavein et al. (1997).  
A further reason for the occurrence of M&As can be deduced from the merger waves that 
have occurred throughout history. Kleinert and Klodt (2002:3‒4) identify five specific 
merger waves occurring during the twentieth century and the latter part of the ninetieth 
century. The first merger wave occurred in America and Europe during the 1897‒1904 
period, owing to the effects of the Industrial Revolution and advances in technology used 
by producers. A second wave covered the period 1920–1929 (mention of the countries 
omitted) as the existence of networks within industries, such as railroads and utilities, 
created new opportunities for firms to benefit from economies of scale. The third wave 
can be identified as the period 1965‒1975 with countries such as America and Germany 
being specifically mentioned. During this period, the drive to utilise economies of scale 
was once again a dominating characteristic along with the diversification of products and 
penetration of other markets. A fourth wave occurred during 1984 to 1988 and was more 
prominent in Europe as firms sought the expansion of international rather than domestic 
operations. A fifth wave ran from 1995 until the 2008 Subprime Crisis. An important 
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cause of the fifth wave was the greater integration of both domestic and international 
markets, as well as a trend of deregulation by authorities (mention of the countries is 
omitted).  Kleinert and Klodt (2002) state that the effects of globalisation led to markets 
expanding and with this the size of the participating firms. When combined with an 
increase in deregulation markets began to open up, increasing firms’ market penetration 
through cross-border M&As.  
Several reasons have been put forward as to why a cluster of M&A activity occurs. 
Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) explain that not only do the merger waves share 
common characteristics of region and time, but also of industry. An example is the wave 
of banking M&As that followed the Subprime Crisis. Shleifer and Vishny (2003), as cited 
by Harford (2005), explain merger waves by modelling M&As in terms of stock market 
misevaluations between firms that merged. The disparity between the bidder’s overvalued 
shares and target’s undervalued assets can provide the incentive for a bidder to merge 
with or acquire the target. Managers with short time horizons are thus quick to accept the 
bidder’s overvalued equity. This conclusion supports the rationale for merger waves that 
occur during periods of significant economic growth and rising share prices, a situation 
that was prevalent in most international markets prior to the Subprime Crisis. Harford 
(2005) proposes that external shocks specific to an industry affect the allocation of 
resources within an economy. Harford (2005) states that this allocation, combined with 
sufficient liquidity, can often cause a merger wave. Using this rationale, the 2008 to 2009 
increase in M&As among financial firms can thus be explained by the economic shocks 
of the Subprime Crisis and real economic contraction that followed. This combined with 
an increase in liquidity to markets via historically low interest rates and government 
bailout lending for distressed firms, as was seen in Europe and America, resulted in a rise 
in M&As. Maksimovic, Phillips and Yang (2009) explain that the reason for merger 
waves lies at either end of a continuum. On the one hand, the occurrence of merger waves 
is due to investment opportunities occurring in waves, while on the other, they are based 
on the adjustment of liquidity and investment climates causing certain firms to obtain 
capital more cheaply. Maksimovic et al. (2009) found that public firms engage more in 
mergers and have greater cyclical characteristics to their M&A decisions than private 
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firms. In addition, sensitivity to changes in the macroeconomic environment is stronger in 
public firms. Thus, “public firms are almost twice as likely to buy assets in aggregation 
wave years than in non-wave years while purchases from private firms are relatively 
much flatter” (Maksimovic et al., 2009:1).  
As explained earlier, M&As tend to occur in waves, as elements that affect their 
occurrence, such as industry-specific shocks, occur likewise. These shocks are evident in 
the five merger waves identified by Kleinert and Klodt (2002). Elements such as greater 
globalisation, the transformation of the European markets into a centralised one, the 
industrial revolution, or a push by firms towards effective economies of scale have all 
contributed to greater M&A activity. In line with this, these waves tend to share common 
characteristics of region, time and industry. As explained above, such shocks can include 
the current state of the economy (expansion or contraction). Harford (2005) found that 
merger waves occur during periods of economic contraction, while Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003) found that M&A waves occur during periods of economic expansion. Indeed, it is 
often the change in the economic climate in which the businesses operate that provides 
the impetus for managers of firms to engage in M&As.       
2.3 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST M&As 
There is ongoing debate as to whether gains exist from the perspective of the bidder 
firm’s or the target firm’s shareholders. The following section contains arguments for 
whether the bidder or the target shareholders benefit from M&As.  
2.3.1 POSITIVE PRICE EFFECTS FOR BIDDING FIRM SHAREHOLDERS 
James and Wier (1987) found that mergers are wealth creating for the bidding firm’s 
shareholders. This study assessed American bank M&As during the 1972‒1983 period 
and reviewed the extent to which competition in the market for bank acquisitions affects 
the returns attributable to the acquirer's share price. Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) found 
a positive outcome when assessing the synergistic gains from American M&As during 
the 1963‒1984 period. Jarrell and Poulson (1989) found that bidding firms’ shareholders 
earn a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 2.15%, measured ten days before and thirty 
10 
days after an M&A. The sample in this study contained tender offers from the 1963‒1986 
period where either the bidder or the target was listed on New York or American Stock 
Exchange. Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) support this finding, identifying a positive 
outcome for the bidding firm’s shareholders using a pre-tax operating cash flow 
performance measure for M&As of non-financial companies. All these deals involved an 
American bidder for the period 1979‒1983. Betzer, Goergen and Metzger (2009) found 
inconclusive results for bidding firms when investigating the use of M&A motives to 
determine abnormal share performance for American M&As during the 1989‒2003 
period. Kang (1993) and Becher (2000) support this finding.   
Houston and Ryngaert (1994) mention several characteristics of M&A deals that can lead 
to both the bidder and the target firms’ share prices appreciating. These include bidder 
profitability prior to the M&A, the method of financing, as explained by Asquith, Bruner 
and Mullins (1990), or the degree of operational overlap between the bidding and the 
target firms. As such, the degree to which an M&A is wealth creating or destroying can 
be related to the extent that the participating firms have the above characteristics. The 
previous section contained a discussion of several reasons for firms engaging in M&A 
activity. These can be used to describe the theoretical proposition that the bidding firm’s 
shareholders gain from M&As. However, one must note that these opinions tend to be 
long term in nature, such as the benefit associated with technical, pecuniary and synergic 
advantages discussed by Lubatkin (1983). To consider the bidding firm as benefitting 
from an increase in earnings and share price, one would need a longer time horizon since 
these advantages develop much later and can be extremely complex in nature. As such, 
evidence is lacking on the short-term profitability of M&As from the point of view of 
shareholder wealth in the bidding firm. 
2.3.2 NEGATIVE PRICE EFFECTS FOR BIDDING FIRM SHAREHOLDERS 
M&As can be detrimental to the bidding firm’s share price. Dodds and Quek (1985) 
explain that when firms fail in merging with or acquiring another firm, the rate of change 
in the same firm’s share price is greater than that of the stock market index twelve 
months after the failed attempt. Houston and Ryngaert (1994) found mergers to be a 
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wealth-destroying event for bidders’ shareholders when assessing American banking 
M&As during the 1985‒1991 period. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) found that, during the 
1980‒1991 period, American bidders under-performed the market index for three years 
after an M&A. Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007) support the opinion that M&As are 
detrimental by mentioning that there is no significant improvement after cross-border 
banking M&As for participating firms. Lorenz and Schiereck (2007) found in their study 
of European banking M&As during 1990 to 2002 that acquiring firm shareholders incur a 
negative CAR of 1%, measured one day before and after the event. Thus, M&As are not 
necessarily profitable and can be very detrimental to the bidding firm. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that certain M&As are pursued by managers in 
order to enhance their remuneration or status within an industry. Accordingly, such 
managers may seek an M&A, which may result in the bidding firm shareholders 
incurring losses. This theory is referred to as the agency motive and is based primarily on 
the assumption that a firm’s managers do not act in the best interest of the firms’ 
shareholders. This theory is mentioned in articles such as Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004). 
Lubatkin (1983) discusses several elements that affect the profitability of M&As, such as 
the competitive strength of the bidder or target, the growth rate of the bidder’s markets 
and the degree to which these fit with the strengths and market growth rates of the target 
firm. Mahoney and Weinstein (1999) state that appraisal remedies afford corporate 
shareholders the option to redeem their shares for cash in the event of certain 
transactions, including M&As. Thus, creation of certain loopholes allowing shareholders 
to sell their shares adds to the incentive for them to liquidate their holding in a company 
rather than take the risk of losing money as a result of a decline in the share price.  
Altunbas and Marques Ibáñez (2004) state that M&As in the banking sector tend to 
benefit shareholders when both banks have geographical or product relatedness. These 
authors (Altunbas & Marques Ibáñez, 2004) explain that when differences exist among 
these elements, the decline in overall shareholder value is quite conspicuous. Antoniou, 
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Arbour and Zhoa (2006) state that the shares of potential target firms often carry a 
takeover premium. Thus, bidding firms can often pay a premium over and above an 
already excessive share price. A bidding firm’s shareholders may feel that this premium 
is too high and will sell shares, causing a drop in the share price and a loss for the bidding 
company’s remaining shareholders. Intuitively, this is a result of shareholders perceiving 
the costs of the M&A (e.g. the premium paid and the uncertainty involved in the M&A) 
as exceeding the benefits (Dodds & Quek, 1985). The concept of bidders paying in 
excess of the target company’s equity is referred to as the “hubris hypothesis” (Roll, 
1986). Well (2006) explains this theory by stating that bidders often overestimate the 
value or potential of the perceived synergies between firms. This leads to a negative price 
effect on the equity of the bidding firm, as the share is purchased at an inflated price in 
relation to fair value. 
The question still remains as to why opinions differ with respect to the outcome of 
M&As. A possible answer is provided by Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) who explain 
that the choice of market index used played a significant role in determining whether 
American M&As during the 1975‒1984 period was profitable for the acquirer. Franks et 
al. (1991) found that using an equally weighted market index caused the acquirer to lose, 
while a value-weighted benchmark yielded a gain. Thus, the use of an eight-portfolio 
benchmark is recommended as there was no statistically significant abnormal 
performance for the overall sample of bidders. These results are, however, refuted by 
Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) who explain that the conclusions were specific to 
the time period of the study as well as to the mixing of tender offers with mergers. 
Consistent with the above literature, the conclusion as to whether an M&A will benefit 
bidding shareholders is inconclusive. However, the literature does indicate that the 
consolidation between two firms tends to be negative for the bidding firm’s shareholders. 
2.3.3 POSITIVE PRICE EFFECTS FOR TARGET FIRM SHAREHOLDERS 
Target firms’ shareholders often benefit from an increase in the share price of the 
company when an M&A deal is announced. When comparing empirical studies, Lubatkin 
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(1983) found that almost all gains are conceded to the target firm’s shareholders when 
using a performance measure developed from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
Dennis and McConnell (1986) found that target shareholders of American firms during 
the 1962‒1980 period earned a CAR of 13.74% measured six days before and after the 
event. Maquieira et al. (1998) measured a CAR of 41.65% for target shareholders for a 
period of sixty days before and after the announcement. Maquieira et al. (1998) made use 
of M&As involving American firms during the 1963‒1996 period. Ramakrishnan (2010) 
found that target shareholders of Indian firms from 1996 to 2002 earned a CAR of 11.6%, 
measured ten days before and after the announcement.  
Choi (1991) calculated the abnormal returns (ARs) for American mergers for the 
1982‒1985 period by determining a cumulative prediction error which is dependent on 
the continuously compounded rates of return to the specific share and market index. Choi 
(1991) found that target shareholders earn positive ARs when the investment made in 
these companies is of a toehold nature. Toehold investments are “an accumulated position 
of five percent or more of common stock of a firm” (Choi, 1991:391). A possible 
interpretation is provided by Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) who explain that a toehold 
investment can entice the bidder firm to engage in specific activities with the target firm, 
such as M&As. Shareholders of target firms who engage in these activities tend to earn 
positive AR. In essence, the purchase of a toehold investment by a firm increases the 
chances that a future merger may occur. De Long (2001) supports this view in finding a 
16.61% CAR for target shareholders during a time period spanning ten days before and 
one day after the announcement. The sample comprised American M&As during the 
1988‒1995 period. Houston et al. (2001) performed a cross-sectional regression relating 
bidder and target ARs to merger-related revenue gains and valuation estimates of merger 
gains. Houston et al. (2001) found a CAR of 20.80% for target shareholders from a 
sample of sixty-four banking M&As. The event window was measured for a period of 
four days before and one day after the announcement period and was applied to American 
mergers occurring during the 1985‒1996 period. Campa and Hernando (2004) explain 
that target shareholders of European firms during the 1998‒2000 period earn on average 
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a CAR of 9% in a month’s time interval around the announcement date. This finding is 
supported by De Long (2003), Goergen and Renneboog (2004) and Well (2006).   
Several reasons are proposed as to why an appreciation in the target firm’s share price 
occurs as a result of an M&A. The intuitive explanation is the greater perceived 
profitability of a company once it has been acquired by the bidder. Choi (1991) notes that 
target firms tend to observe an appreciation in their share price after takeovers, proxy 
fights and management turnovers, while target firms not encountering such control 
transfers incur losses. The existence of an increase in share prices when toehold 
investments are disclosed suggests that investors view the conclusion of M&A deals as a 
positive factor in the target firm’s ability to generate revenue.  Brealey, Meyers and Allen 
(2006) offer two views on why target shareholders benefit from a greater return on the 
value of their equity than bidding firms. The first relates to the target shareholders 
earning higher ARs when merger gains are measured in absolute USD terms. This is due 
to the size differential between large bidders and smaller targets. The second relates to the 
increase in the target’s share price as two or more companies bid for the firm.   
The appreciation in the target’s share price is naturally linked to the perceived increase in 
profitability that an M&A will have on a company, but the question still remains as to 
why an M&A will increase the revenue of a firm. Several factors that can lead to a 
greater profitability due to mergers and include the increase in corporate growth and 
development, suggested by Delaney and Wamurizi (2004), or the increase in the firm’s 
market power as mentioned in Lubatkin (1983), Akhavein et al. (1997) and Lanine and 
Vander Vennet (2007). Given the foregoing opinions the consolidation between two 
firms tends to be positive for the target firm’s shareholders. 
2.3.4 NEGATIVE PRICE EFFECTS FOR TARGET FIRM SHAREHOLDERS 
Few examples exist of losses being incurred by target shareholders after the 
announcement of an M&A. Karceski et al. (2005) found that, during the 1983‒2000 
period, target shareholders of Norwegian banks incurred a negative CAR of 1.52% during 
a time interval of one to seven months after the merger announcement. Fuller, Netter and 
Stegemoller (2002) found a negative CAR of 1% for target firms during a time interval of 
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two days before and after an M&A involving an American bidder during the 1990‒2000 
period. 
A possible explanation for the negative effects, as described by Campa and Hernando 
(2004), can be the occurrence of cultural, legal and transactional barriers that cause the 
proposed M&A to be unsuccessful.  These obstacles can have substantial effects on the 
purported value of the transaction and can lead to a reversal of the appreciation in the 
share price that target shareholders benefited from when the M&A was announced. Share 
prices can often increase well above fundamental levels, thus possible barriers 
encountered can lead to a revision of the price. In short, there are only a few examples of 
shareholder losses for the target firm.  
2.4 METHODS USED IN DETERMING PROFITABLITY 
Several methods exist for determining the effects of M&As. Delaney and Wamurizi 
(2004) consider the determination of profitability from the point of view of the dataset 
used, namely accounting and market.   
In relation to market data, Delaney and Wamurizi (2004) state that the primary difference 
from accounting is that share prices represent all available information in relation to the 
company. Share prices are also determined by outside individuals. This data is harder to 
manipulate when compared to accounting data. A firm’s share price depends on the 
future expected earnings of the firm. Thus, by analysing the share price of a firm rather 
than the earnings, one is merely analysing the end result of the M&A, and that which 
determines the returns that shareholders either earn or lose. Antoniou et al. (2006) 
advocates that the mere use of market data does not yield a precise calculation of the 
economic value generated by M&As. Antoniou et al. (2006) found that analysing short-
term changes in the share price can lead to poor estimates of the effects on shareholder 
wealth. Antoniou et al. (2006) states that investors can over- or under-react to changes in 
situations or sudden news that can cause the share price of a firm to deviate from 
fundamental levels. This irrational behaviour impugns the assumption that a financial 
market is semi strong market efficient (SSME) and can impair the ability to distinguish 
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real economic gains from gains made via short-term investor speculation. Antoniou et al. 
(2006) make use of the Dot.com bubble as an example where investor speculation 
affected shareholder wealth independently of economic fundamentals. Studies that make 
use of market data include Eckbo (1983), Barnes (1984), Bradley et al. (1988), Delong 
(2003a), Well (2006), Lorenz and Schiereck (2007), Von Gersdorff and Bacon (2009), 
Ramakrishnan (2010) and Spyrou and Siougle (2010).  
A technique which is becoming more popular for evaluating M&As and makes use of 
market data is event studies. MacKinlay (1997) states that event studies can assess the 
impact of an event on the value of a firm. As early as 1933, James Dolley applied the 
event study method to determine the price effects of stock splits, while Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen and Roll (1969) used this technique to test whether the process of stock splitting is 
generally focused on a specific kind of return behaviour. The use of the event study 
method is advantageous in two important ways. Firstly, it is well suited to studies with a 
short-term horizon, as the shorter the event window, the less other events contaminate the 
share price (MacKinlay, 1997). The second advantage is that event studies can be used to 
validate the assumption of SSME when analysing market data. By providing a 
simultaneous measure of both the return for the bidding and the target shareholders, as 
well as an implicit test of SSME, more credibility can be given to these results.  
Several criticisms have arisen from event studies, particularly those which relate to the 
data used. Brown and Warner (1985) found that results based on returns with a daily 
frequency can be affected by non-normal returns, bias in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimates of market model parameters in the presence of non-synchronous trading, as 
well as issues of variance increases on the days surrounding the event date. The non-
synchronous trading issue relates to prices being recorded during varying time intervals 
thus posing a possible bias (MacKinlay, 1997). However, Brown and Warner (1985) 
found that, using simulation procedures, the characteristics of daily data generally present 
few difficulties in the context of the event study method.  Another area of debate for 
event studies is the technique to determine the ARs attributable to a firm’s shareholders. 
MacKinlay (1997) mentions that the two most common techniques remain the constant 
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mean return model and the market model, which measure a mean return by simply 
determining the rate of change in an economic index. MacKinlay (1997) describes two 
more ways in which to estimate the market return. The first is factor models and 
multifactor models such as that used in the study done by Flannery and James (1984) on 
bank returns, where the second factor incorporated was the yields on long-term US 
government bonds. MacKinlay (1997), however, describes the benefits of using these 
models to determine ARs as being limited. The reason for this is “the empirical fact that 
the marginal explanatory power of additional factors [above] the market factor is small, 
and thus, there is little reduction in the variance of the abnormal returns” (MacKinlay, 
1997:18). The other class of model described by MacKinlay (1997) to estimate market 
returns is economic models and include the CAPM. MacKinlay (1997) states that the 
CAPM was a popular choice during the 1970s and 1980s, however, it has virtually ceased 
being used owing to criticisms of the restrictions that it imposes and the sensitivity of the 
results obtained in terms of these restrictions. 
Turning to the data used, Delaney and Wamurizi (2004) state that another source of data 
is accounting, which measures the performance of the bidder and the target firms in terms 
of their ability to generate profit and cash flow, as well as the value of their net assets. 
Articles that make use of this method include Pilloff (1996) who determines the financial 
impact of an M&A by comparing the pre-merger and post-merger status of three elements 
which include profitability, efficiency and specific line items of a firm’s balance sheet. 
Pilloff (1996) makes use of 48 banking M&As for the 1982‒1991 period and compares a 
firm’s return relative to an industry benchmark. Pilloff (1996) establishes this benchmark 
by determining the performance of banks of similar size and geographic location. This 
author mentions that the profitability of a firm can be measured by net profit as this 
represents the bottom-line performance of a firm and by operating income, as any 
changes in this figure can be directly attributed to changes in a firm’s operating 
performance. All profits that are represented in Pilloff’s (1996) study are relative to both 
a firm’s total assets and total equity. 
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As stated in the previous section, an increase in operating efficiency is often mentioned 
by authors as a reason for banking M&As. Pilloff (1996) explains that the accounting 
method provides a useful technique for determining this form of gain, as it assesses the 
behaviour of a firm’s expenses. A decrease in expenditure during the post-merger period 
should be informative in terms of the operating efficiency of a firm. Pilloff (1996) 
estimates a firm’s costs by determining the sum of its interest and non-interest costs. This 
cost is scaled by the average value of total assets, net and operating income. Pilloff 
(1996) does concede, however, that efficiency gains caused by the M&A may be better 
represented by movements in the individual expense items that should be affected the 
most by the M&A. These items include employee costs, fixed asset expenses and total 
non-interest expenses. In relation to specific line items of a firm’s balance sheet, Pilloff 
(1996) notes that accounting ratios such as capital to assets, loans to assets and deposits 
to assets indicate the financial performance of a firm. When these ratios are compared 
during the pre-merger and post-merger periods, the effect of the M&A on a bank’s 
financial position can be better assessed.  
Another article which makes use of accounting data is Healy et al. (1992), who assess the 
operating performance of fifty M&As involving an American bidder during the 
1979‒1983 period. Healy et al. (1992) define a pre-tax operating cash flow model to 
assess whether a firm’s operating performance has improved. In Healy et al.’s (1992) 
study, cash flows are defined as the net profit from the sales of goods, less the 
administrative and selling expenses, plus a firm’s depreciation and goodwill expenses. 
This return metric is adjusted by each firm’s market value in order to provide a 
benchmark according to which a firm’s performance can be measured. Healy et al. (1992) 
state that this measure provides a better estimate of a firm’s operating performance than 
earnings, as it unaffected by different accounting measures that firms may use. Healy et 
al. (1992) notes that this factor can restrict the degree to which a firm’s operating 
performance can be assessed, particularly if the firms being compared are domiciled in 
different countries with different accounting standards. Healy et al. (1992) found that 
firms report significant post-merger improvements in their operating cash flow. Antoniou 
et al. (2006) advocate the use of accounting data by stating that a return to analysing the 
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fundamentals of whether a merger is successful is necessary for a credible estimate of the 
generation of economic wealth. These fundamentals include the leverage of the company 
and its future profitability or quality of management. However, Delaney and Wamurizi 
(2004) note that accounting data can have flaws if companies make use of creative 
accounting techniques in order to conceal the true state of the company’s financial 
position. Antoniou et al. (2006) counter this by saying that in spite of the argued 
flexibility in Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), accounting data remain 
the best indicator of a company’s economic performance. In addition, Betzer et al. (2009) 
find that, besides the article by Healy et al. (1992) discussed earlier, studies that measure 
the returns that shareholders gain or lose from an M&A by using accounting data are 
measured during a much longer time period. As such the ability to measure short-term 
gains by shareholders is often limited when making use of accounting data. A possible 
explanation is that firms only produce financial statements quarterly or bi-annually during 
a financial year. Consequently, changes in merger performance can only be measured at 
the intervals when these results are released. The frequency of accounting data is a 
contrasting characteristic to market data where a change in a firm’s share price and thus 
the benefit of the merger can be measured on the days before, during and after the M&A. 
Betzer et al. (2009) states that a significant flaw of accounting data is that the post-
acquisition performance of returns can be influenced by the method of financing used. 
For instance net profit attributable to a firm takes into account interest expenses. As such, 
if an M&A is financed by debt its net profit is lower than if the M&A is financed by 
stock. Thus, to compare the net profit across firms can often be misleading when different 
forms of financing are used.  Betzer et al. (2009) found that studies that use either method 
yield contrasting results. Studies that make use of market data, such as an event study, 
find on average that M&As have a overall positive effect for shareholders while studies 
that focus on accounting performance to measure the effect of an M&A find that overall 
results are on average negative. Thus, two possible situations can be observed ‒ one 
where the use of market data yields a positive outcome for the firm’s shareholders and the 
use of accounting data produces a negative outcome for firm’s shareholders (Situation I), 
or where a negative outcome is produced by the use of market data and a positive 
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outcome is produced by using accounting data (Situation II). Betzer et al. (2009) find that 
both situations can be explained by analysing the acquirer’s motive for pursuing the 
M&A. 
In relation to M&As occurring in Situation I, the prevention of negative events external to 
a firm is a possible explanation. Specific mention of this is made in Fridolfsson and 
Stennek (2005), who found that it is often better for a firm to merge with another firm, 
thereby pre-empting rival firms from doing so. Thus, it is often advisable to participate in 
a merger to prevent the losses that may be incurred if a rival firm were to buy the 
company. Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005) refer to this as the pre-emptive motive. 
Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005) use the failed merger of Volvo and Scania in 1999 as an 
example. At the time, Volvo stated that the motivation for acquiring Scania was to 
prevent another firm from doing so. Thus, when an M&A is initiated by the acquirer to 
prevent a rival firm’s merger it can affect the accounting performance of the firm owing 
to the cost of the merger, but lead to a share price increase owing to the unprofitable 
effects of a rival firm’s merger being avoided.  
In relation to M&As resulting in Situation II, the mispricing of the acquiring firm’s 
shareholdings is a possible explanation. Betzer et al. (2009) notes that if a firm’s share 
price is overvalued at some point in time, in the long run shareholders will eventually buy 
and sell the share to a point where the share price reflects the firm’s fundamental value. 
Thus, if a firm has overvalued shares, managers may use them to purchase the 
undervalued shares of the target company. Betzer et al. (2009) state that through this 
mechanism a rational firm that realises the overvaluation of its shares can lock in the 
value of real assets by using them to purchase another firm. The result of this is a sudden 
decline in a firm’s market price in order to reduce it to the fundamental value of the 
combined firm. Betzer et al. (2009) state that if one assumes that a firm’s managers act in 
the best interests of its shareholders, the merger would only be done if the financial 
performance of the company were to improve, thus compensating shareholders for the 
drop in share prices. The above example shows that when an M&A is initiated in order to 
take advantage of mispricing between the bidder and target firms’ share prices, it can 
21 
often result in a negative effect on the accounting performance of a firm owing to the cost 
of the merger, but a positive effect on the share price owing to the unprofitable effects of 
a rival firm’s merger being avoided.  
To assess the validity of the reasoning used to justify Situation I and Situation II, Betzer 
et al. (2009) used 927 acquisitions involving US companies during the 1989‒2003 
period. In line with Healy et al. (1992), the accounting performance of a firm is measured 
using a ratio of operating cash flow to the book value of its assets. In order to assess the 
impact of a merger on the accounting performance of a firm two benchmarks are used. 
The first comprises a portfolio of firms that are of similar size to acquirers and had an 
operating cash flow ratio for one year before the merger announcement. The second 
portfolio differs from the first in that the firms comprising the benchmark are from 
different industries to the acquirer. Mention of the specific industries is omitted, however, 
the authors state that banks and insurance companies are excluded. To determine the 
performance of the merger with market data the event study method is applied where 
ARs are measured with a market model. Betzer et al. (2009) find that the empirical study 
conducted supports the claim that both situations can be explained when analysing the 
acquirer’s motive for pursuing the M&A.  
Both methods of estimating the economic value of M&As are, however, still criticised. 
Several authors have proposed that the use of more qualitative methods to assess whether 
an M&A is profitable for the bidder’s and target firm’s shareholders may be appropriate 
given the above criticisms. An example is provided by Capron and Mitchell (1997). 
Capron and Mitchell (1997) assessed four cross-border M&As in America and Europe. 
These firms formed part of the telecommunication equipment manufacturing industry and 
were sampled during the 1988‒1992 period. In order to determine whether the M&A was 
a success, the authors interviewed the executive managers from the bidder and target 
firms, as well as those of the new entity created in cases where the target ceased operating 
independently. The primary conclusion across all M&As is that a firm’s capabilities 
received at least some level of improved performance. Capron and Mitchell (1997) state 
that the combined entity operated in a more geographically distinct market than the 
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individual firms had done before the merger. In addition, the managers of the bidder and 
target firms described a positive effect on each firm’s research and development (R&D), 
owing to an increase in a firm’s ability to share knowledge and resources in the design of 
new products. Capron and Mitchell (1997) support the above findings by analysing the 
post-merger profitability and sales of the firms under study. Capron and Mitchell (1997) 
concluded that the M&A had a positive effect in relation to the operating performance of 
the acquiring and target firms.  
Brouthers, Hastenburg and Van der Ven (1998) make use of a qualitative approach by 
interviewing seventeen managers of bidding Dutch firms and asking them to rate 
personal, economic and strategic motives for pursuing an M&A with another firm. After 
the M&A the authors assessed whether the most important motives had been 
accomplished. Thus, the performance of the bidder and target should be measured against 
the goals set by management rather than the financial results. For example, if 
management’s goal was to cut the debt of the target firm then the acquirer’s financial 
performance may have been poor from a shareholders perspective, since most of the 
profits were used to settle debt and were not distributed as dividends. The qualitative 
approach provides a useful technique for avoiding the deficiency inherent in the market 
and accounting data approaches. However, it has seldom been used in recent articles that 
assess whether an M&A is profitable for the bidder and target firm’s shareholders.  
To conclude, there are two primary methods for determining the profitability of an M&A. 
The first is to assess if an M&A has a profitable affect by assessing the movement in the 
bidder and target firms’ share prices. The second is to assess if an M&A has a profitable 
affect by assessing the change in a firm’s operating performance. However, both methods 
contain flaws and thus a third method has been developed. This method makes use of a 
qualitative approach to assess whether an M&A is profitable for the bidder and target 
firms’ shareholders.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter contains details of the empirical analysis to be applied in the study. The first 
section describes the method used in analysing the data. The second section contains 
details of the firms included in the study, as well as the descriptive statistics. 
3.2 METHOD 
In order to determine whether bidder and target banks earn ARs from M&As during real 
economic expansion and contraction, the study follows MacKinlay (1997). If the 
presence of ARs is observed around the event day then it is assumed that the event had an 
effect on the value of the firm. While the current study considers M&As as the event 
under study, Yip (2009) states that several events besides M&As can be used to assess 
the ARs attributable to shareholders and includes earning announcements, dividend 
announcements, debt or equity issues and corporate reorganisation.  
Let τ = 0 be the event date (which is the earliest date that news of the event becomes 
known to the public), τ = T1 +1 to τ = T2 represents the event window, with L1 = T2 – T1 
representing the window length, and τ = T0 + 1 to τ = T1 constitutes the estimation 
window with the length being represented by L2 = T1 – T0.  
Figure 3.1: Estimation and event window timeline 
                                           
Source: MacKinlay (1997:20) 
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Figure 3.1 shows that an event study incorporates two separate, yet equally important, 
time periods in order to assess whether an event has a statistically significant effect on a 
firm’s share price. The first period is referred to as the event window and incorporates 
what is known as the event day. This is seen as the day on which the event under study 
occurred. MacKinlay (1997) notes that the challenge in identifying the event day depends 
on the type of event under study. For instance, the event date of a natural disaster or 
mining accident can be identified easily. Accordingly, the ARs earned or lost by 
shareholders on the event day are specifically attributed to the event and any ARs that 
shareholders earned or lost on the days prior to the event are identified as being caused by 
other factors.  However, the event date for an M&A or earnings announcement can be 
harder to determine. The easiest way to determine when the event occurred is to use the 
announcement date. However, elements such as insider trading or the release of 
information about the event prior to the official announcement date can result in 
shareholders gaining or losing statistically significant ARs prior to the event day. This 
issue is referred to as information leakage. Thus, the ARs of shareholders on the day of 
the announcement may not be an accurate measure of the full effect of the event on the 
share price of the firm. As such, the event window is not made up of the event day only, 
but often of several days before and after the event. By incorporating the days before and 
after the event, the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for shareholders can be 
measured, completely quantifying the effects of the M&A. As the above shows when 
applying the event study method, the concept of ARs is crucial.  
The second time period is referred to as the estimation window and is seen as the non-
event time period. During this period, the ARs earned or lost by shareholders in the 
absence of the event can be assessed. As such, this window is vital in order to assess if 
the ARs that investors earned or lost during the event window differs from those earned 
or lost in the absence of the event. By making this comparison, one can make inferences 
as to the affect the event had on the share price of the firm.  
Four estimation and event windows are used to assess the ARs earned by bidder and 
target shareholders (see Table 3.1). These follow Well (2006) and Lorenz and Schierick 
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(2007), who study the effect of M&As on target and bidder shareholder wealth during 
banking M&As, as well as, studies by Brown and Warner (1985) and MacKinlay (1997), 
whose articles guide the market return-generating process and method to be used in this 
study. The use of multiple event and estimation windows results from the lack of 
consensus on the identification of an appropriate start date from which returns can be 
measured. Goergen and Renneborg (2004) explain that too narrow an event window may 
cause substantial measurement error, particularly if information leakage occurred. On the 
other hand, a very wide event window will overstate movements in the share price and 
incorporate other variables, causing contamination. In addition, event windows are often 
chosen that limit the degree of overlap between them. This helps to validate the 
assumption of cross-sectional independence and zero covariance between share returns. 
This is, however, only possible for events where event date clustering is not observed.  
Table 3.1: Estimation and event window lengths 
Author Date 
Estimation 
window (days) 
Event window 
(days) 
BROWN & WARNER 1985 (‒244, ‒6) (‒5,+5) 
WELL 2006 (‒104, ‒6) (‒5,+24) 
LORENZ & SCHIERECK 2007 (‒250, ‒21) (‒10,+10) 
MACKINLAY 1997 (‒229, ‒21) (‒20,+20) 
 
Brown and Warner (1980) state that a firm’s share returns can only be considered 
abnormal if measured against the returns of a specified benchmark. Various methods 
exist for determining the benchmark returns of a security. The study makes use of the 
three most popular methods in the event study literature, henceforth to be denoted as 
Models 1, Model 2 and Model 3. Model 1 is the market-adjusted return model described 
by Brown and Warner (1985): 
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                                                                                                      [3.1] 
 
The AR of share i at day t is equal to the continuously compounded return for share i at 
day t less the continuously compounded return for a market index ( ). Brown and 
Warner (1980) state that Model 1 assumes returns are equal across all shares, but not 
constant for any particular share. This technique is useful when events occur in close 
proximity to one another, as the estimation window is only used to estimate the variance 
of the average abnormal returns (AAR) attributable to shareholders. Thus, the possibility 
of estimation window overlap and cross-sectional dependence of share returns is 
mitigated. One possible drawback to Model 1 is that the firms analysed are not 
represented in the market index chosen. Thus, the market return measured can often 
incorporate fluctuations that are not specific to the shares under study and thus increases 
the degree of measurement error in the AR estimated. Articles that make use of this 
model include Von Gersdorff and Bacon (2009) and Spyrou and Siougle (2010).  
Model 2 is the mean-adjusted return model described by Brown and Warner (1985):  
                                                                                                [3.2] 
 
the AR of share i at day t is equal to the continuously compounded return for share i at 
day t, less the arithmetic mean of share i’s daily returns in the estimation window ( . 
Thus a shareholder’s return is defined as abnormal if it differs from the return observed 
during a period preceding the event window; therefore the model unrealistically assumes 
that the expected return of a share is constant.  
Brown and Warner (1985) find that Model 2 often yields results similar to more 
sophisticated models, such as Model 3. MacKinlay (1997) explains this by stating that the 
variance of the ARs in Model 2 is not reduced when ARs are calculated in more 
sophisticated models. Thus, Model 2’s primary benefit is its simplicity, ease of 
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calculation and consistent performance when compared to other models. Articles in 
which this model is applied include Ramakrishnan (2010).  
Model 3 is the market model described by MacKinlay (1997).  
                                       [3.3] 
 
The AR of the share is given by the continuously compounded return for share i at day t 
less  and determined during the estimation window. represents the intercept of the 
securities market line (SML) while  represents the slope and is calculated as the ratio of 
the covariance between returns to the individual share and market index divided by the 
variance of the returns to the market index. Brown and Warner (1980) state that this 
model takes into account the systematic risk of each share return and the market-wide 
factors affecting all shares in the given study. Articles that make use of this model 
include Barnes (1984), Bradley et al. (1988) and Delong (2003a). For all three models 
under the null, the AR is described as jointly normally distributed with a zero conditional 
mean and conditional variance.  
]                           [3.4] 
 
It is important to note that a multifactor model is not considered owing to the theoretical 
deficiencies as noted by Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) and Campbell (2000). 
In order to provide a cross-sectional view of the abnormal performance of firms’ shares, 
the arithmetic mean or AAR is computed, where the AAR across all shares during period 
τ is  
                                            [3.5] 
with variance  
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                                         [3.6] 
 
Since  is unknown in practice, it is estimated from the time series of AAR during the 
estimation window. Since the AAR is assessed during a specific period, it is necessary to 
determine the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR). The CAAR is calculated as 
the sum of AAR  
                                     [3.7] 
with variance  
                             [3.8] 
 
Thus, the CAARs that shareholders earn are attributable to a shareholder who bought the 
share on the first day of the event window and sold it after the last day. 
The test statistic for all models is taken from MacKinlay (1997):  
                                 [3.9] 
 
If the CAARs are independently identically distributed with a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one, the statistic follows a Student’s t distribution with n – 2 
degrees of freedom (df) for Model 3 and n ‒ 1 for Models 1 and Model 2.  The df is 
determined by the number of parameters comprising each return-generating process. This 
statistic describes the ratio of each day’s CAAR against its estimated standard deviation. 
The null hypothesis describes a situation where the banking M&A has no effect on the 
behaviour of a bank’s share returns (H0: CAAR = 0). MacKinlay (1997) states that the 
results derived from the statistic are asymptotic with respect to the number of shares N 
and L1. Thus, changes in the sample of firms or event windows will proportionately and 
directly affect the value of the test statistic. Kothari and Warner (2004) state that the test 
statistic measured is a random variable owing to the measurement error apparent in its 
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estimation. This error is attributed to two elements of a firm’s AR. Firstly, estimates of a 
firm’s expected returns are imprecise, owing to the non-event expected return (measured 
during the estimation window) never yielding an exact estimate of what the ARs for 
shareholders would have been had the M&A not occurred. The second element is that, in 
the shareholders’ ARs of each firm there exists a portion which is not attributable to the 
event. Thus, the total ARs shareholders earn on an event may not be fully attributable to 
the M&A, and are possibly related to unobserved influences. Kothari and Warner (2004) 
state that when ARs are aggregated over a number of firms this element does not average 
to zero, thus supporting the random variable nature of the test statistic. Kothari and 
Warner (2004) state that the CAAR test statistic is well specified provided that the 
variance is estimated correctly. Kothari and Warner (2004) explain that elements such as 
the cross-sectional dependence of share returns would create downward bias in the 
estimated standard deviation, causing upward bias in the test statistic. The implication of 
this is an increase in the test statistic yielding a Type I error where the null hypothesis is 
erroneously rejected. Thus, the statistical significance of the CAARs that shareholders 
gain or lose during the event period can be overestimated.  
Kothari and Warner (2004) state that in cases of event period uncertainty the use of a 
non-parametric test statistic might also be effective in helping to generate a test statistic 
that is well specified. Serra (2002) provides two examples of these forms of test. The first 
is a Generalise Sign test, which tests whether the frequency of positive ARs attributable 
to shareholders equals 50%. In order to determine this, one determines the level of shares 
whose ARs are non-negative under the null hypothesis of the M&A having no effect on 
shareholder returns. The value of the null is determined as the percentage of shares with 
non-negative abnormal returns during the estimation window. Serra (2002) states that 
under the null hypothesis ARs which are non-negative in value should follow a binomial 
distribution with parameter  if ARs are independent across all securities. Given this, the 
test statistic that follows is proposed: 
                                                  [3.10] 
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where is the observed percentage of firms with non-negative ARs.  
The second is a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test, with the test statistic given by 
                                                 [3.11] 
 
The above test assumes that all of the ARs are non-zero, with the test statistic determined 
as the sum of all ARs which are greater than zero, with the null hypothesis of equally 
likely positive and negative ARs. Serra (2002) states that, given a large sample size of 
firms, the test statistic under the null follows a normal distribution. 
Given the above comments, this study omits non-parametric test statistics owing to the 
relative certainty of the event date and their lack of use in recent articles that make use of 
the event study method to determine whether an M&A had a statistically significant 
affect on a firm’s share price. These include Well (2006), Ramakrishnan (2010) and 
Spyrou and Siougle (2010).  
3.3 DATA 
In this study, the share returns
1
 of 27 completed banking M&A deals were analysed. All 
deals were completed during the 2001‒2010 period with details of each deal appearing in 
Table 3.2. The years 2004 and 2008 contain the most M&A activity with no deals 
sampled from 2009. All banks considered in this study take deposits from individuals, 
businesses and public entities. Thus, financial services firms that provide investment 
banking and advisory functions only are excluded. All but one deal comprised both 
parties (bidder and target) being a bank. The exception is the deal involving the American 
Government and Capital One Corp, which formed part of the Capital Purchase Program 
(CPP) initiative conducted by the United States Treasury (UST). The deal involved UST 
purchasing preferred stock and equity warrants of the company, thus providing funding to 
troubled firms. It formed part of the wider Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and is 
                                                 
1 
All banks share prices were extracted from Bloomberg Database.  
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reported separately. To mitigate the issue of contamination, firms with share prices 
containing share-specific events (besides the merger), either during the estimation or 
event window, were excluded. In addition, certain mergers were removed in order to 
prevent event date clustering and the possibility of event window overlap. It is important 
to note that if event window overlap is present and the bidder and target of one M&A had 
a different domicile to the other bidder and target, then cross-sectional independence of 
share returns is assumed. Two-fifths of all deals assessed were in the form of a cash 
purchase, while stock-for-stock deals comprised less than one-third (Table 3.2).  
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Table 3.2: M&A deals 
Event Date Bidder/Acquirer Firm Domicile Target Firm Domicile
Means by which M&A 
occured (0 cash, 1 
shares)
4 December 2001
Overseas-Chinese Banking 
Corporation Ltd
Singapore Keppel Tatlee Bank Indonesia 0
26 September 2002 M&T Bank USA Allied Irish Banks UK 0,1
01 November 2002
Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce
Canada
FirstCaribbean 
International Bank
Barbados 0
16 December 2002 Credit Agricole France Credit Lyonnais France 0,1
7 March 2003 Société Générale France Social Secutrity Bank Ghana 0
27 October 2003 Bank of America                                      USA FleetBoston Financial USA 1
15 January 2004 JP Morgan Chase USA Bank One Corporation USA 1
1 March2004
Fubon Bank Hong Kong 
(Fubon Financial holding)
Hong Kong IBA Hong Kong 0
16 July 2004 PNC Financial Services USA Riggs Bank USA 0,1
27 July 2004 Global Trust Bank Indian 
Oriental Bank of 
Commerce
Indian 0
12 August 2004 Wing Hang Bank Hong Kong Chekiang First Bank Hong Kong 0
5 March 2005
Capital one fianacial 
corporation
USA Hibernia Bank USA 0,1
30 June 2005 Bank of America                                      USA MBNA Corporation USA 0,1
13 June 2005 Barclays Bank UK ABSA South Africa 0
13 May 2006 BNP Paribus France
Banca Nazionale del 
Lavoro
Italy 1
25 May 2006 Regions Financial corporation USA Am South Bancorporation USA 1
9 December 2006 ICICI Bank India Sangli Bank India 1
16 February 2007 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
Argentaria
Spain Compass Bancshares USA 0,1
16 August 2007 Fifth Third Bank USA First Charter Bank USA 0,1
18 September 2007 Standard Chartered Bank UK
American Express Bank 
Ltd
USA 0
25 February 2008 HDFC Bank India Centurion Bank of Punjab India 1
26 March 2008 Royal Bank of Canada Canada
Royal Bank of Trinidad 
and Tabago
Trinidad and Tabago 0,1
31 August  2008 Commerzbank                  Germany Dresdner Germany 0,1
24 October 2008 PNC Financial Services USA National City Corp USA 1
14 November 2008 USA Government USA Capital one USA 0
20 November 2008 Banco do Brasil Brazil Banco Nossa Caixa Brazil 0
15 March 2010 Thanachart Bank Thialand Siam City Bank Thialand 0
Note: Firm’s names in bold are omitted from the study 
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Most bidding banks are American and French while most target banks are American and 
Indian (Table 3.3). In the case of American and European banks, an explanation is 
provided by Hagendorff, Collins and Keasey (2007), who state that the promotion by 
regulators of a more integrated banking sector in America and Europe has led to a 
significant increase in banking M&As. These were enacted as a result of the significant 
deregulation of the financial sector, involving the removal of geographical restrictions 
and demarcation lines between different types of financial services. The promotion of the 
European Monetary union is an example of the removal of domestic barriers in a 
European context. Hagendorff et al. (2007) confirm this explanation, using America as an 
example. Hagendorff et al. (2007) state that until the late twentieth century, two key 
restrictions were placed on American financial institutions.
2
 The first imposed the 
separation of retail and investment banking operations. Thus, investment and retail banks 
were prohibited from merging with one another or from owning companies that operated 
in the other industry. The second restriction related to geographical scope: branching 
regulations were transferred from national to state level with interstate branching being 
forbidden. Thus, the American financial services industry consisted of many institutions; 
a structure which remained largely intact until legislation was passed rescinding these 
restrictions.
3
 This resulted in an increase in banking M&As as the market’s structure 
changed from a fragmented one to a national banking system. 
In relation to the question as to why the second greatest number of targets was Indian, the 
explanation relates to the restructuring of Indian institutions. Ramakrishnan (2010) states 
that an ease in Indian regulations, the restructuring of family-owned conglomerates and 
the sale of state-owned companies enticed other firms to merge with or acquire Indian 
firms. Delong (2003b) explains that many of these reforms started in 1991 in response to 
the bankruptcy of the government of the era. Thus, a significant movement away from a 
centrally planned to a more liberal and capitalist economy occurred. Delong (2003b) 
states that encouraging capital imports and commodity exports, industrial deregulation 
and tax system rationalisation were examples of the apparent reform which ensured that 
                                                 
2
Restrictions existed as a result of the Banking Act of 1933.  
3
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Efficiency Act of 1994 and the Gramm-Leach-Biley Financial 
Modernisation Act of 1999. 
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foreign firms could access the Indian market more easily thereby leading to greater M&A 
activity.  
Table 3.3: Geographical origins of bidder and target firms 
 
Country
Proportion of 
Bidders (% )
Country
Proportion of 
Target (% )
USA 36 USA 50
France 12 India 12.5
India 8 France 6.25
UK 8 UK 6.25
Canada 8 Brazil 6.25
Hong 
Kong
8 Thailand 6.25
Brazil 4
South 
Africa
6.25
Germany 4 Italy 6.25
Singapore 4 Germany 0
Spain 4
Hong 
Kong
0
Thailand 4 Canada 0
South 
Africa
0 Singapore 0
Italy 0 Spain 0
Total 100 Total 100  
Source: Bloomberg (2010) & own calculation
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Table 3.4 contains descriptive statistics for each share return during two sampling 
periods. The first period consists of returns sampled 270 days before (‒ 270) and 20 days 
after (+20) the event date. It thus takes into account the estimation and event window and 
represents a period were the banks sampled were involved in M&A activity. This is 
referred to as the merger period and is reported in Panel A. The second period consists of 
share returns sampled from 2005/10/28 to 2006/11/304, representing a period were the 
banks sampled were not involved in any M&A activity. This is referred to as the non-
merger period and is reported in Panel B. By splitting the share returns one is able 
observe the share price behaviour when the banks undertake M&A activity and when 
they do not. It is important to note that, during the discussion of the descriptive statistics, 
no distinction is made between bidder and target banks. This analysis is undertaken in the 
next chapter.  
Turning to the merger period, two-thirds of all share returns have a mean value that is 
greater than one. Thus, shareholders tend to gain by holding bank shares. In relation to 
skewness, two-thirds of all share returns are positively skewed. The maximum skewness 
observed was 8.01 while the minimum was ‒3.35. Thus, while shareholders tend to gain 
from holding bank shares during this period, a shareholder can also lose. In relation to 
kurtosis, more than two-fifths of share returns have a value greater than three, indicating 
that share returns are leptokurtic. The minimum kurtosis observed was 0.39 while the 
maximum is 102.95. Thus, shareholders tend to gain or lose substantial amounts.  
The merger period can be split further into those M&As that occurred during periods of 
real economic expansion and contraction. For periods of economic expansion, almost 
three-fifths of all share returns have a mean value that is greater than one, meaning that 
shareholders tend to gain during this period on average. Two-thirds of all share returns 
are positively skewed, with the maximum being 8.01 and minimum ‒2, which is 
consistent with the observation that shareholders tend to gain during this period on 
average. Half of all share returns have a kurtosis value greater than three, indicating again 
                                                 
4
Owing to a lack of data, the following firm’s returns were sampled over different non-merger periods: 
Credit Lyonnias 2002/07/02 to 2003/07/01, Riggs Bank, Hibernia Bank, MBNA Corporation, 2003/12/01 
to 2004/12/01, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 2005/10/28 to 2006/07/25.  
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that shareholders tend to gain or lose substantial amounts. For periods of economic 
contraction the results are very different. Four-fifths of all share returns have a mean 
value that is less than one. Thus, shareholders during this period tend to lose on average. 
The degree of skewness in the share returns supports this finding with more than half of 
all share returns being negatively skewed. A greater portion of share returns are 
leptokurtic when compared with the economic expansion sample, with three-fifths of 
share returns having a kurtosis value greater than three, indicating that shareholders tend 
to gain or lose substantial amounts. The minimum value observed is 1.85 while the 
maximum is 35.6, meaning that shareholders tend to confront extreme values in share 
returns more often on average when compared to the expansion period. 
For the non-merger period (Panel B) the level of skewness among firms is similar to that 
in the merger period, with two-thirds of all share returns being positively skewed, 
meaning that shareholders tend to gain on average. The minimum value is, however, less 
at ‒0.41, while the maximum of 15.74 indicates that more shareholders who held bank 
shares during the non-merger period tended to lose less or gain to a greater extent. This 
finding is supported by nearly nine out of ten firms’ mean share returns being positive. 
The above can be explained by the fact that no country experienced an economic 
contraction during the non-merger period. It is intuitive that as the economy grew so did 
firms (and bank’s) earnings resulting in an appreciation of their respective share price. 
Kurtosis is different during the two periods with less than one-fifth of share returns 
following a leptokurtic distribution in the non-merger period. More than two-thirds of 
share returns tend to have kurtosis between 0 and 3, implying that most share returns are 
mesokurtic in the non-merger period. The minimum kurtosis observed was 0.02 while the 
maximum was 15.74, thus shareholders who held bank shares during the second period 
confronted extremes values less frequently than in the case of the merger period.  
In order to ascertain whether daily share returns are serially correlated at lag 1, the Ljung-
Box Q statistic is computed. To calculate the Q statistic, the autocorrelation coefficient 
(AC) of share returns at lag 1 is  
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                                     [3.12] 
 
where  is the sample mean of R and ‒1 ≤ AC ≤ 1. If AC1 is non-zero, first-order 
correlation is present. More than half of the shares in the merger period have a positive 
correlation in daily share returns. For shareholders of banks, one can expect that share 
returns on a certain trading day will positively affect share returns a period later. If this 
period is broken down per economic state, just more than half of all banks have a positive 
correlation when the mergers occurred during an expansion. For those that occurred 
during a contraction, three-fifths of share returns tend to have a negative correlation in 
daily share returns. Thus, during periods of real economic contraction, one can expect 
that share returns on a certain trading day negatively affect share returns a period later. 
For the non-merger period, half of the share returns have an AC greater than zero. Thus, 
shareholders during this period are evenly split between those that can expect that share 
returns on a certain trading day will positively affect share returns a period later, and 
those that can expect share returns on a certain trading day to negatively affect share 
returns a period later. 
The null hypothesis for the Q-statistic test of serial independence in share returns up to 
order 1 lag is used with 
                                       [3.13] 
 
where AC1 is the 1st order autocorrelation and T is the number of observations. For the 
merger period, the findings are that 37, 34 and 29 of 41 firms’ returns are serially 
correlated at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Shareholders can thus expect a 
statistically significant relationship between previous daily share returns and the share 
returns day on day for at least seven out of ten banks. When broken down per economic 
state, shareholders can expect a statistically significant relationship between previous 
daily share returns and the share returns day on day for at least three quarters of all banks, 
while for periods of real economic contraction this can be expected for eight out of ten 
firms. For the non-merger sample, the findings are that 34, 31 and 24 out of the 38 firms’ 
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returns assessed are serially correlated at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. In line with the 
merger sample, shareholders can thus expect a statistically significant relationship 
between previous daily share returns and the share returns day on day for at least seven 
out of ten banks. 
Real economic growth, for the bidding firms’ countries is given in Table 3.5, where red 
represents quarters of negative real GDP growth and green shows quarters of positive 
growth. For all countries except Canada, quarterly real GDP growth rates were available 
on Bloomberg. Table 3.6 contains details of the economic performance of bidding firms’ 
countries measured from the final quarter of 2000 through to the first quarter of 2010. 
The Indian economy grew the most in real terms during this period, while the German 
economy grew the least. This represents a 6.72% point difference between their 
respective arithmetic mean growth rates, with the factors contributing to India’s high 
growth rate having already been mentioned above. Additional factors accounting for the 
substantial growth in the Indian economy since 2003/2004 are mentioned by Mohan 
(2008) and include low interest rates, a climate conducive to investing, strong global 
demand, and stringent fiscal policy. 
In relation to Germany, Carlin and Soskice (2009) found that the low economic growth 
can be attributed to two key structural elements. The first is the wage restraint policies 
urged by the government. Suppressed wages weakened aggregate demand and affected 
economic output. The second factor relates to the pro-cyclical fiscal policy implemented 
by the government. This, along with the wage restraint policies, amplified the effects of 
external macroeconomic shocks such as the Dot.com bubble and Subprime Crisis of 
2007‒2008, causing a significant slowdown in economic growth and high levels of 
unemployment. A contributing factor to the large difference in real GDP growth rates 
between the Indian and German economies is related to the developed and developing 
state of Germany and India respectively. Todaro and Smith (2006) note that two factors 
play an important role in explaining why developing countries’ GDP growth rates are 
often larger when compared to those of developed countries. The first relates to the fact 
that developing countries often have access to technology that developed countries did 
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not have in their initial stages of growth. As such, developing countries are able to 
employ more productive techniques of production and bypass the initial stages of 
technological development pioneered by developing countries. The second factor is the 
smaller amounts of capital and the lower levels of profitability in developing countries. In 
such cases, the marginal increase in the product of capital and returns on investments 
would be expected to be higher in developing countries. Thus, output would grow at a 
much faster rate in developing countries, albeit off a lower base than developed countries.  
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics 
 
Overseas-Chinese 
Banking Corporation Ltd
M&T Bank Allied Irish Banks
Canadian 
Imperial Bank of 
Commerce
Credit 
Agricole
Credit Lyonnais
Société 
Générale
Bank of 
America                                      
JP Morgan 
Chase
Fubon Bank 
(Fubon Financial 
Holding)
PNC Financial 
Services
Mean (%) 0.00 0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.01
Standard Deviation (%) 1.01 0.76 1.09 0.83 1.20 1.12 1.34 0.58 0.75 0.79 0.41
Skewness -0.42 0.09 -1.18 0.03 -0.18 1.10 0.23 -2.00 -0.16 1.41 0.06
Kurtosis 1.85 3.76 12.27 1.70 1.54 10.05 1.84 14.31 0.89 9.21 1.08
Autocorrelation (Lag 1) -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 0.10 0.09 -0.08 -0.06 -0.18 0.02
Ljung-Box Q 0.13 1.98 0.11 0.00 1.24 2.75 2.19 1.59 0.84 8.93 0.12
p-Value 0.71 0.16 0.74 0.95 0.27 0.10 0.14 0.21 0.36 0.00 0.73
Riggs Bank
Oriental Bank of 
Commerce
Wing Hang Bank
Capital One 
Financial 
Corporation
Hibernia 
Bank
Barclays Bank ABSA
Bank of 
America                                      
MBNA 
Corporation
BNP Paribus
Banca Nazionale del 
Lavoro
Mean (%) 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.01
Standard Deviation (%) 0.91 1.79 0.94 0.60 0.70 0.54 0.51 0.36 0.90 0.54 0.37
Skewness 1.96 -0.95 0.24 0.14 6.36 -0.27 0.25 -0.39 1.71 -0.27 0.31
Kurtosis 13.77 7.83 2.03 0.84 75.47 0.98 0.43 0.39 63.11 0.77 10.16
Autocorrelation (Lag 1) -0.09 0.18 0.10 -0.02 0.06 -0.05 0.06 -0.02 0.03 -0.11 0.10
Ljung-Box Q 2.37 9.22 2.49 0.10 1.03 0.60 1.06 0.10 0.26 3.58 2.64
p-Value 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.75 0.31 0.44 0.30 0.75 0.61 0.06 0.10
Regions Financial 
Corporation
Am South 
Bancorporation
ICICI Bank 
Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya 
Argentaria
Compass 
Bancshares
Fifth Third 
Bank
First Charter 
Bank
Standard 
Chartered 
Bank
HDFC Bank
Centurion Bank 
of Punjab
Royal Bank of 
Canada
Mean (%) 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.05 -0.03
Standard Deviation (%) 0.43 0.43 2.08 0.50 0.46 0.56 1.08 0.73 1.20 1.46 0.63
Skewness 0.93 0.08 0.16 -0.37 1.82 0.37 8.01 0.09 -0.08 -0.42 0.48
Kurtosis 8.52 0.70 1.35 1.16 11.20 4.88 102.95 3.73 1.74 8.15 1.86
Autocorrelation (Lag 1) -0.08 -0.05 0.12 0.10 0.18 -0.29 0.04 -0.06 0.13 0.11 -0.04
Ljung-Box Q 1.67 0.55 3.95 2.52 8.44 22.25 0.44 0.83 4.47 3.20 0.47
p-Value 0.20 0.46 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.36 0.04 0.07 0.49
Commerzbank                  
PNC Financial 
Services
National City 
Corp
Capital One 
Financial 
Corporation
Banco do 
Brasil
Banco Nossa 
Caixa
Thanachart 
Bank
Siam City 
Bank
Mean (%) -0.11 -0.03 -0.44 -0.11 -0.10 0.14 0.17 0.23
Standard Deviation (%) 1.45 1.44 4.52 2.34 1.89 1.95 1.05 1.32
Skewness 0.29 0.63 -3.35 -0.03 0.30 1.29 0.43 2.65
Kurtosis 4.25 3.88 35.60 2.47 2.52 7.86 2.48 19.99
Autocorrelation (Lag 1) 0.01 -0.15 0.06 -0.08 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.06
Ljung-Box Q 0.01 5.95 1.11 1.93 0.04 4.05 0.75 0.85
p-Value 0.92 0.02 0.29 0.17 0.85 0.04 0.39 0.36
Panel A: Merger Period
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Overseas-Chinese 
Banking Corporation Ltd
M&T Bank Allied Irish Banks
Canadian 
Imperial Bank of 
Commerce
Credit 
Agricole
Credit Lyonnais
Société 
Générale
Bank of 
America                                      
JP Morgan 
Chase
Fubon Bank 
(Fubon Financial 
Holding)
PNC Financial 
Services
Mean (%) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02
Standard Deviation (%) 0.44 0.39 0.57 0.39 0.66 1.08 0.60 0.35 0.46 0.54 0.46
Skewness 0.02 0.14 0.17 -0.07 -0.41 1.42 -0.16 0.16 0.71 1.41 0.34
Kurtosis 0.60 0.71 1.82 0.23 2.19 13.57 2.05 1.43 3.10 8.84 2.14
Autocorrelation (Lag 1) -0.18 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 -0.10 0.11 0.01 0.06 0.04 -0.17 -0.05
Ljung-Box Q 8.53 0.50 0.27 0.82 2.44 3.09 0.03 0.90 0.35 7.22 0.67
p-Value 0.00 0.48 0.61 0.37 0.12 0.08 0.87 0.34 0.55 0.01 0.41
Riggs Bank
Oriental Bank of 
Commerce
Wing Hang Bank
Capital One 
Financial 
Corporation
Hibernia 
Bank
Barclays Bank ABSA
MBNA 
Corporation
BNP Paribus
Banca Nazionale 
del Lavoro
Regions Financial 
Corporation
Mean (%) 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.02
Standard Deviation (%) 0.90 1.09 0.79 0.66 0.48 0.54 0.91 0.64 0.59 0.35 0.40
Skewness 2.29 0.06 0.03 -1.44 -0.09 -0.01 0.30 -0.40 -0.08 0.74 0.50
Kurtosis 15.74 1.81 2.29 10.95 0.02 1.00 2.67 0.50 0.35 14.15 4.35
Autocorrelation (Lag 1) -0.07 0.14 0.06 -0.08 -0.11 -0.10 0.03 0.02 -0.09 0.23 -0.01
Ljung-Box Q 1.40 5.12 0.93 1.60 2.89 2.74 0.16 0.10 2.00 10.23 0.04
p-Value 0.24 0.02 0.33 0.21 0.09 0.10 0.69 0.75 0.16 0.00 0.85
Am South 
Bancorporation
ICICI Bank 
Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya 
Argentaria
Compass 
Bancshares
Fifth Third 
Bank
First Charter 
Bank
Standard 
Chartered 
Bank
HDFC Bank
Centurion 
Bank of Punjab
Royal Bank of 
Canada
Commerzbank                  
Mean (%) 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.04 0.05
Standard Deviation (%) 0.43 0.94 0.47 0.43 0.49 0.67 0.67 1.08 0.82 0.42 0.81
Skewness 0.37 0.11 0.06 0.15 0.42 0.23 0.01 -0.14 -0.20 0.41 -0.42
Kurtosis 2.10 1.00 0.33 1.28 0.95 0.26 0.33 1.84 1.22 0.73 2.11
Autocorrelation (Lag 1) 0.04 0.12 0.09 -0.03 -0.11 -0.14 -0.08 0.00 0.05 0.01 -0.01
Ljung-Box Q 0.42 3.46 2.11 0.28 3.24 4.75 1.76 0.00 0.73 0.04 0.02
p-Value 0.52 0.06 0.15 0.60 0.07 0.03 0.19 0.96 0.39 0.85 0.90
National City Corp Banco do Brasil
Banco Nossa 
Caixa
Thanachart 
Bank
Siam City 
Bank
Mean (%) 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.03 -0.03
Standard Deviation (%) 0.47 1.27 1.13 0.81 0.82
Skewness -0.16 0.70 0.03 0.41 -0.20
Kurtosis 1.19 3.20 0.42 1.56 1.22
Autocorrelation (Lag 1) -0.10 0.11 0.18 0.03 0.05
Ljung-Box Q 2.77 2.83 8.12 0.22 0.73
p-Value 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.64 0.39
Panel B: Non-Merger Period
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Table 3.5: Periods of economic expansion and contraction in the respective bidders’ countries 
2000 2010
1 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1
2006 2007 2008 20092005
UK
2001 2002 2003 2004
Country
FRANCE
GERMANY
USA
SPAIN
INDIA
SINGAPORE
HONG KONG
THAILAND
CANADA
BRAZIL
 
Note: India's real GDP is measured from 2000Q4–2004Q4 in the 1994 base year prices while 2005Q1–2010Q1 is measured in 1999/2000 
prices. Singapore's real GDP is measured from 2000Q1 with 2005 as a base year. All other country’s real GDP measured during the same 
period is done so with the same base year. In respect to Canada, a three-month arithmetic mean was used to proxy for quarterly growth due to 
Canadian real GDP measured at a monthly frequency. 
Source: Bloomberg (2010) & own calculation 
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Table 3.6: Rate of change in real GDP (2000Q1–2010Q1) 
Country
Arithmetic 
mean (%)
Standard 
deviation ( %)
Skewness Kurtosis 
-1.73 2.54
-1.49 3.09
-0.72 0.01
0.84 2.67
-0.77 0.30
-1.54 2.13
0.12 -0.56
-1.81 2.02
-2.18 3.63
-1.66 2.45
-1.53 2.92
2.491.50UK
2.30 2.41
4.22 3.64
1.80 1.91
3.94 4.20HONG KONG
1.21 1.68FRANCE
GERMANY
USA
0.81 3.13
1.70 1.90
0.63 2.36
5.16 11.69
7.35 2.31
CANADA
THAILAND
BRAZIL
SPAIN
INDIA
SINGAPORE
 
Source: Bloomberg (2010) & own calculation 
Growth rates of more than four-fifths of all countries tend to be negatively skewed. A 
possible explanation for this is the two economic shocks that occurred during the early 
and latter part of the decade. The first was the Dot.com bubble of 1998 to 2000 and the 
subsequent market crash of 2000 to 2002. Ofek and Richardson (2003) state that, in 2000, 
internet companies comprised approximately 6% of the total market capitalisation of all 
American publicly listed companies. These authors (Ofek & Richardson, 2003) show that 
short sale restrictions on such shares prevented prices from dropping to fundamental 
levels, which caused substantial price increase appreciation for technology companies. 
However, Ofek and Richardson (2003) state that real economic factors such as rising 
interest rates and a general slowdown in business demand after the Y2K switchover 
resulted in the demand for technology shares to diminish. On 10 March 2010, the 
simultaneous processing of large sell orders on technology company’s shares caused 
mass sales, which over time eroded all gains that shareholders had earned. Ofek and 
Richardson (2003) state that several large telecommunications and technology companies 
filed for bankruptcy destroying investor confidence and exacerbating the economic 
slowdown that the rising interest rates had caused.  
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The second shock was the Subprime Crisis of the late 2000s. Taylor (2009) explains the 
causes by referring to the American housing market boom and bust of 2006 - 2007, which 
resulted in a diminution of credit extension. The combined effect of increasing oil prices 
and high interest rates caused developed economies to contract during this period. The 
Subprime Crises is dealt with in more detail in the following chapter. The growth of the 
Singaporean economy in real terms was the most volatile during this period, while French 
real economic growth was the most stable. The difference observed between the volatility 
of the country’s economic growth rates is substantial at a 10.01 percentage point 
difference.  
The British economy grew at a fairly volatile rate during the period as indicated by 
kurtosis exceeding 3. The British economy contracted in real terms by 4.9% during 2009 
and was affected more by the Subprime Crises than other developed nations such as 
America, France and Canada, which contracted in real terms in the same year by 2.4%, 
2.5% and 2.8% respectively. According to Hay (2009), the reason for this inferior British 
economic performance is that in Britain, as in America, housing prices dropped 
considerably prior to 2009. Hay (2009) adds that large levels of debt for British 
businesses and consumers were also apparent. The performance of this debt
5
 thus began 
to decrease as domestic interest rates increased, much the same way as in America. With 
new credit becoming more expensive to obtain and difficult to service, British aggregate 
demand and thus economic output were suppressed causing an increase in bankruptcies 
and employee retrenchments and deteriorating investor confidence. Hay (2009) describes 
a second factor as being the pro-cyclical nature of governmental policies together with 
labour market inflexibility. This prevented the retrenchment of additional workers when 
the possibility of real economic contraction loomed. Once GDP had decreased in real 
terms, more employees were retrenched leading to a rise in debt defaults and a drop in 
consumption thereby aggravating the decrease in output.  
 
                                                 
5“The performance of debt” is a term used by lenders to describe the state of a loan. If a debt is performing, 
the borrowers are paying the monthly instalments, meaning the debt is providing a return to the lender 
(bank) and thus is a performing asset. The converse would be a non-performing loan. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter contains the results of the empirical analysis. The first section consists of a 
comparison of the returns earned by bidder and target shareholders confronted by 
different economic states. The second section comprises an assessment of whether an 
M&A deal affected the bidder or target share price on the event day. The issue of SSME 
is considered in the third section, with a discussion relating to the deficiencies of the 
study concluding the chapter.  
4.2 BIDDER AND TARGET SHAREHOLDER RETURNS 
In this section, the effects of M&As on shareholder wealth for bidder and target firms are 
assessed. Table 4.1 shows the difference between share market reactions towards the 
bidding bank’s share returns for periods of real economic expansion and contraction in 
the bidder’s country of domicile. M&As are considered wealth-destroying events for 
bidder banks’ shareholders when measured during real economic expansions and 
contractions. When assessed per economic state, bidder banks’ M&As that occurred 
during real economic expansions gain a CAAR of 0.11% during the (‒5,+5) window and 
0.13% during the (‒5,+24) window in Model 1. However, this is not consistent with 
Model 2 and Model 3, which both imply the wealth-destroying nature of M&As for 
bidder banks’ shareholders. During periods of real economic contractions, bidder banks’ 
shareholders incurred a loss as a result of the M&A. Thus, M&As are considered, on 
average, to be a wealth-destroying event for shareholders of the bidding bank, 
irrespective of the economy’s state, which is consistent with a priori expectations.  
For Model 1 and Model 2, shareholders of bidder banks, whose M&As occurred during 
real economic contractions, incurred a negative CAAR measured for all windows, that is, 
greater than the CAAR for bidder banks’ M&As occurring in real economic expansions. 
For Model 1 there is a 10.87% point difference between the greatest gain during real 
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economic expansions and the greatest loss during real economic contractions, measured 
during the (‒5,+24) window. In relation to Model 2, there is an 2.64% point difference 
between the greatest loss during real economic expansions and contractions, measured 
during the (‒5,+24) window. Thus, the market considered the M&A as being more 
detrimental to the company’s future earning prospects when the M&A occurred during a 
contraction as opposed to an expansion. The explanation for this phenomenon relates to 
two out of the three bidders sampled had acquired targets that were affected by the 
Subprime Crisis of 2008‒20096. Taylor (2009) explains that the American housing 
market crash that occurred subsequent to the M&As led to a rise in foreclosures and 
delinquencies, owing to rising interest rates and declining house prices. Thus, lenders’ 
income statements were affected by the large volume of non-performing loans and the 
drop in value of the collateral attached to such loans. Along with this problem, various 
adjustable subprime mortgages were offered. Taylor (2009) adds that these mortgages 
were securitised in such a way that the risk associated with them was underestimated to a 
significant extent and the high yield, minimal risk nature of such securities was attractive 
to financial institutions. In addition, Taylor (2009) notes that, there was considerable 
uncertainty about each bank’s exposure to the securities and the extent to which possible 
losses would affect the bank’s future operating performance. The pressure on banks’ 
income statements, as well as the uncertainty concerning the extent of future operating 
losses, made the shares unattractive investments. Thus, the M&A was considered to be 
adding the target bank’s sub-prime securities and unprofitable assets onto the bidding 
bank’s already underperforming balance sheet, further adding to the uncertainty of future 
operating performance. 
For the bidder’s shareholders, the least negative CAAR was observed for the (‒5, +5) 
window in Model 1 and was not statistically significant when measured using 
MacKinlay’s (1997) normally distributed CAAR t statistic. It should be noted that all 
mentioned made of statistical significance going forward is in reference to the test 
statistic specified in Chapter Three. Turning to the bidder banks’ CAAR measure during 
                                                 
6
 PNC Financial Services acquisition of National City Corp (October 2008) and Commerzbank’s merger 
with Dresdner Bank (October 2008).  
47 
periods of real economic contraction, the greatest negative CAAR is measured for the 
(‒5,+24) window in Model 3, and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Such results 
are similar to the CAAR associated with bidder banks’ M&As occurring during real 
economic expansions and contractions. 
Table 4.1: CAAR for bidding banks’ shareholders: total period and economic 
states 
CAAR (%) -0.34** -0.50** -10.06*
t-stat (-2.29) (-2.62) (-53.06)
CAAR (%) -1.18* -1.66* -31.57*
t-stat (-7.70) (-9.02) (-171.66)
CAAR (%) -0.99 -1.27* -21.16*
t-stat (-7.13) (-6.68) (-111.04)
CAAR (%) 0.11 -0.36 -10.35*
t-stat (0.72) (-1.80) (-51.17)
CAAR (%) 0.13 -0.36*** -31.25*
t-stat (0.80) (-1.82) (-158.44)
CAAR (%) -0.42 -0.96* -21.34*
t-stat (-2.92) (-4.72) (-105.07)
CAAR (%) -3.59* -1.46*** -7.97*
t-stat (-5.98) (-2.21) (-12.06)
CAAR (%) -10.74* -11.19* -33.89*
t-stat (-15.19) -15.48 (-46.86)
CAAR (%) -5.18* -3.58* -19.86*
t-stat (-9.01) (-5.43) (-30.09)
(-5,+5)
(-5,+24)
(-10,+10)
(-5,+5)
(-5,+24)
(-10,+10)
(-5,+5)
(-5,+24)
(-10,+10)
Panel B: Expansion, Bidder
Panel C: Recession, Bidder
Panel A: Total Period, Bidder
Event 
Period
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3Metric
 
Note: * denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and 
*** denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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For periods of real economic expansion and contraction, Table 4.2 contains the difference 
between stock market reactions towards the target bank’s CAARs. For Model 1 and 
Model 2, M&As create wealth for the target banks’ shareholders when measured during 
real economic expansions and contractions. For Model 3, however, M&As destroy wealth 
for the target banks’ shareholders. The worst loss incurred by shareholders, measured in 
Model 3 during the (‒5,+24) window, represents an 24.47% point difference between the 
greatest gain measured in Model 1 during the (‒5,+24) window and a 24.84% point 
difference between the greatest gain measured in Model 2 during the (‒5,+24) window. 
Research that makes use of Model 3 to determine the CAARs attributable to target 
shareholders is discussed in Eckbo (1983), Jarrell and Poulson (1989) and Houston and 
Ryngaert (1994). In their study on European acquisitions from 1993 to 2000, Goergen 
and Renneboog (2004) made use of Model 3 in research that involved firms from 
multiple industries. However, this research differs from that mentioned above, as 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) adjust the beta estimates by adjusting the share and 
market returns to ensure that they are measured between the time of last trade in the 
respective firms, as done in Dimson and Marsh (1983). This adjustment is made to 
control for thin trading in share returns which often biases the beta downwards. Bradfield 
(2003) explains this phenomenon, stating that thin trading may cause the closing price of 
a stock on a specific day to not be determined by a trade on that specific day, but rather 
by a trade occurring on previous days. Thus, the market index value may not be matched 
to the trade for a share on that day but rather to trades on various other days. This 
mismatch impacts on the covariance estimate between the share returns and the market 
returns, causing a downward bias in the covariance estimate and thus impacting on the 
beta estimate. The depth of trading volumes was not taken into account in this study and 
may provide possible insights into the difference observed with regards to shareholder’s 
CAARs and the levels of their statistical significance in Model 3 when compared to 
Model 1 and Model 2. Given the problems of Model 3 mentioned in the previous chapter, 
as well the ease of computation of Models 1 and Model 2, recent event study articles 
rarely use Model 3 in the calculation of ARs, as shown by Spyrou and Siougle (2010) 
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who make use of Model 1, and Ramakrishnan (2010), who makes use of Model 2 to 
determine the CAARs attributable to bidder and target firms during M&A. 
Turning to M&As occurring during an economic expansion, shareholders of target banks 
gain when the CAAR is measured in Model 1 and Model 2. This is again consistent with 
a priori expectations. For Model 3, the M&A destroys wealth for the target banks’ 
shareholders. The worst loss incurred by shareholders, measured in Model 3 during the 
(‒5,+24) window, represents a 22.12% point difference between the greatest gain 
measured in Model 1 and a 22.10% point difference between the greatest gain measured 
in Model 2. For Model 2, the CAAR is greater for the (‒5, +24) window by 1.04% when 
compared to the (+10,-10) window and 1.01% when compared to the (+10, ‒10) window. 
M&As destroy wealth for a target bank’s shareholders whose M&As occurred during real 
economic contractions. This result is consistent across all models and differs from a 
target bank’s M&A that occurred during a period of real economic expansion.  This 
phenomenon can be explained by analysing the real economic contraction of the 
American economy while these M&As were being concluded and is described in Taylor 
(2009). With lenders still affected by non-performing loans, the issuance of risky 
securitised assets and high interest rates, credit became more expensive for consumers 
and businesses. Taylor (2009) notes that this caused a contraction in American aggregate 
demand and when combined with increasing oil prices and the decrease in American 
house prices, allowed the Subprime Crisis to affect the American economy. A market-
wide drop in share prices occurred, with the S&P 500 index losing more than one-third of 
its value between New Year’s Day 2007 and the end of 2008. Taylor (2009) notes that the 
financial sector shares led the general drop in share prices due to the sub-prime securities 
and poorly performing assets on their balance sheet. Banking targets were merged with 
bidder banks that incurred the same drop in earnings and default on their assets.
7
 Thus, 
the shareholders considered such M&As as having a negative effect on the future 
earnings prospects of the new entity, and sold their shares in the target bank causing a 
drop in its share price. The decrease in share prices of financial firms affected the share 
                                                 
7
For lenders, a loan is viewed as an income-generating asset based on a contract. Thus, if borrowers are 
unable to repay the loan the contract is breached and the income is lost, thus, a default on a bank’s assets 
(loans) occurs resulting in a drop in income.  
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prices of companies belonging to other sectors, causing a market-wide decrease. This 
result should be similar to the share price decrease in technology companies during the 
during the Dot.com bubble. In addition, these results should be consistent with the 
decrease in share prices of companies deriving a significant portion of revenue from 
emerging markets during the South East Asian crisis of the late 1990s. 
Turning to target banks’ CAAR during periods of real economic contraction, the greatest 
positive CAAR is measured in Model 1 during the (‒10,+10) window and is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The greatest negative CAAR is measured in Model 3 during 
the (‒5, +24) window, and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 4.2:CAAR for target banks’ shareholders: total period and economic states 
CAAR (%) 2.89* 2.61** -6.47*
t-stat (7.56) (-5.94) (-14.74)
CAAR (%) 3.1* 3.47* -21.37*
t-stat (-6.37) (6.14) (-37.83)
CAAR (%) 3.81* 3.33* -13.59*
t-stat (12.07) (10.57) (-37.63)
CAAR (%) 3.83* 3.84* -4.59*
t-stat (15.26) (12.81) (-15.29)
CAAR (%) 4.81* 4.85* -17.25*
t-stat (17.81) (14.17) (-50.39)
CAAR (%) 4.87** 3.81*** -12.39*
t-stat (2.21) (1.95) (-41.09)
CAAR (%) -3.75 -6.03* -19.69*
t-stat (-1.54) (-2.40) (-7.83)
CAAR (%) -8.88** -6.20*** -50.15*
t-stat (-2.72) (-1.84) (-14.86)
CAAR (%) -3.63*** -0.03 -22.01*
t-stat (-2.03) (-0.01) (-12.18)
Model 2 Model 3
Panel A: Total Period, Target
(-5,+5)
(-5,+24)
(-10,+10)
Panel B: Expansion, Target
Panel C: Recession, Target
Event 
Period
Model 1
(-5,+5)
(-5,+5)
(-5,+24)
(-10,+10)
(-10,+10)
(-5,+24)
Metric
 
Note: * denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and 
*** denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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As mentioned previously, the analysis of target banks’ share price performance during 
periods of real economic contraction comprises M&A were both the bidder and target are 
banks. This statement however has one exception, the TARP deal made mention to in 
Chapter 3. While the study of the TARP deal is not an objective of the study a separate 
analysis provides insights into the effect these deals had on share prices of banks as well 
as to control and identify any significant changes it may have had on the overall results. 
Table 4.3 shows the target banks’ CAARs excluding the TARP deal. Across all windows 
and models, the target banks’ shareholders earn greater CAARs when the TARP deal is 
omitted. This result is found during periods of both real economic expansions and 
contractions. An explanation for this phenomenon relates to the fact that fewer target 
M&As occurring during real economic contractions are included in the total period 
sample. Thus, fewer CAARs are considered in calculating the total period CAAR. 
Table 4.3: CAAR for target banks’ shareholders excluding all TARP deals: total 
period and economic state 
 
CAAR (%) 3.15* 3.49* -6.32*
t-stat (8.42) (7.92) (-14.32)
CAAR (%) 3.43* 3.87*** -23.01*
t-stat (7.37) (1.97) (-40.74)
CAAR (%) 4.94* 4.46* -20.42*
t-stat (2.18) 12.77368 (-58.52)
CAAR (%) -6.45 -1.45 -30.52*
t-stat (-1.50) (-0.31) (-6.58)
CAAR (%) -15.89* -9.93 -103.55*
t-stat (-2.76) (-1.59) (-16.59)
CAAR (%) 5.9** 13.47* -33.85*
t-stat (16.64) (3.67) (-11.47)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Panel A: Total Period, Target EXCL TARP 
Panel B: Recession, Target EXCL TARP 
Event 
Period
(-5,+5)
(-5,+24)
(-10,+10)
(-5,+5)
(-5,+24)
(-10,+10)
Metric
 
Note: * denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% 
level and *** denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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An explanation for this phenomenon relates to the target bank analysed ‒ National City 
Corp – being affected by the Subprime Crisis. During the Crisis, National City Corp’s 
wholesale mortgage division closed and an investigation by the American Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in respect of irregularities in relation to loan underwriting 
and bank regulations was conducted. Thus, the bank’s shareholders incurred substantial 
losses during this period. When compared to the other target bank sampled during the 
period of real economic contraction ‒ Capital One Corp ‒ shareholder losses were 
different. During the Subprime Crisis, Capital One Corp was in distress and required 
TARP funds to prevent it from bankruptcy, but its operating performance was affected 
less than National City Corp’s. Thus, the losses that shareholders of Capital One Corp 
incurred were less than those incurred by shareholders of National City Corp. This caused 
a decrease in the magnitude of the targets’ CAARs which were negative during the real 
economic contraction period. For targets and bidders, across periods of real economic 
expansions and contractions, daily CAAR appear in Appendix B, Table B1.1‒B3.3. 
4.3 EVENT SIGNIFICANCE  
The application of the event study method allows one to determine whether an M&A had 
a statistically significant effect on the CAAR of the bidder and the target firm. Table 4.4 
contains an overview of event windows and market models where a statistically 
significant effect on a bank’s shareholders’ CAAR is observed on the event day. Across 
all three event periods and models, the affect of the banking M&A was statistically 
significant for just over four-fifths of banks’ share returns at the 5% and 10% level 
respectively. While over two-thirds of banks’ share returns across all three event periods 
and models was significant at the 1% level. Target banks’ share returns, measured during 
real economic expansions and contractions, were affected by their M&As, with more than 
four-fifths of all banks’ CAARs on the event dates being statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Bidder banks’ share returns measured during the same economic expansions and 
contractions were similar, with four-fifths of all event date CAARs being statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
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Bidder banks’ CAARs were affected by their M&As when these occurred during real 
economic expansions, with four-fifths of all event date CAARs being statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Bidder banks’ CAARs, whose M&A occurred during a 
contraction, are affected less by their M&As in comparison to M&As occurring during 
real economic expansions, with one-third of all event date CAARs being statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Turning to target banks’ M&As occurring during the bidder 
countries’ economic expansions, fewer than two-thirds of all event date CAARs were 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The result is similar to the effect of M&As on 
target banks’ share prices whose M&As occurred during periods of real economic 
contractions. Thus, when analysing target banks’ CAAR, whose M&As occurred during 
real economic expansions and contractions, the discrepancy between the statistical 
significance of CAARs is less conspicuous when compared to the difference between 
bidder banks’ CAARs during periods of real economic expansions and contractions. An 
explanation for this phenomenon relates to how the economic state is defined for the 
M&A. As mentioned in Chapter 1, an M&A is deemed to have occurred during a period 
of real economic expansion and contraction by determining the state of the economy of 
the bidder’s country. Thus, the state of the economy will affect the bidder bank’s CAAR 
more than the target bank’s CAAR. This is especially the case if the country in which the 
target is domiciled has a different economic state to the bidder’s country. An example is 
the case of cross-border M&As which comprise more than a tenth of the total deal 
sample. 
For all economic states, target banks have a statistically significant CAAR on the day 
prior to the event day for less than four-fifths of the event windows, at the 1% level. In 
comparison to bidder banks, the CAAR is only statistically significant for two-thirds of 
all event windows, at the 1% level. For periods of economic expansion, target banks have 
a statistically significant CAAR on the day prior to the event day for two-thirds of all 
event windows, at the 1% level, while for bidder banks just more than half of event 
windows have a CAAR on the day prior to the event day that is significant at the 1% 
level. For periods of economic contraction, target banks have a statistically significant 
CAAR on the day prior to the event day for two-thirds of all event windows at the 5% 
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level, while for bidder banks under half of all event windows have a CAAR on the day 
prior to the event day that is significant at the 5% level. Thus, the market can identify 
M&A targets before the bidder is identified given that on average more targets experience 
statistically significant movement in share prices before the event day than when 
compared to bidders. One example is the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and ABN 
AMRO M&A in 2007. On 23 April 2007, Barclays Bank announced a proposed 
acquisition of ABN AMRO. However, two days later a consortium led by RBS made a 
counter offer. Given that RBS offered a greater amount, ABN AMRO’s board accepted 
its offer and withdrew its support for the Barclays bid on 30 July 2007. Thus, the target 
bank was identified almost three months before the potential bidder.  
Turning to the issue of a target bank’s M&A occurring during a period of real economic 
contraction, the removal of the TARP deal from the analysis did not affect the results. 
Thus, the market accounted for this deal in a similar way to other M&A deals that 
occurred during a period of real economic contraction. In relation to the suitability of the 
test statistic applied, De Jong, Kemna and Kloek (1992) explain that returns obtained 
under the assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity may be spurious if returns take 
extreme values and have differing variances. Kramer (2001) explains that if the above 
features are ignored, the test statistic tends not to follow its assumed distribution. This 
may cause the test statistic to over or under estimate the statistical significance of the 
event on share returns.  To address this issue, bootstrapping procedures are often used to 
estimate the level of bias in the test statistic. Hein and Westfall (2004) classify these tests 
into two broad categories, namely data-based bootstrapping and test-statistic based 
bootstrapping. Data-based bootstrapping involves bootstrapping the share returns in order 
to estimate an empirical distribution function from which inferences about the possible 
bias in the test statistic can be made. Serra (2002) uses this technique as a means of 
estimating bias in a test statistic, by determining N AR in the event day where N is the 
number of firms used in the analysis. Many bootstrapped samples are generated from the 
initial sample of ARs determined above. No mention is made of the number of samples 
generated or whether sampling is done with replacement. For each sample, Serra (2002) 
computes the expected AAR and explains that in order to compute the statistical 
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significance of CAAR one would need to repeat this process for the preceding days in the 
event window in order to compute a CAAR for each bootstrapped sample. Serra (2002) 
applies the shift method where the distribution is shifted to the left by the average 
population expected value, in order to make inferences with regards to the possible bias 
in the test statistic. Thus, the null hypothesis of AAR = 0 is rejected if   
                                                                 [4.1] 
 
Where α is the level of significance, NS is the number of bootstrapped samples and η is 
the number of times the random sample generates an AAR which is less than a criterion 
value. The criterion value is defined as the actual sample value minus the population 
expected value (by assumption this is zero) plus the expected value of the simulation 
averages (AAR). 
Test-statistic based bootstrapping involves bootstrapping the test statistic itself in order to 
create an empirical distribution from which inferences about the possible bias in the test 
statistic can be made. Kramer (2001) makes use of this method, determining a sample of 
N ti statistics during a single-day event period. The ti statistic in this case is the test 
statistic of the dummy variable coefficient for each firm in a multivariate regression 
model (MVRM), while N is the number of firms used in the study. Using the sample of ti 
statistics, a Z statistic can be determined with 
                                                      [4.2] 
 
Kramer (2001) normalises the Z statistic by dividing by the standard deviation of the 
sample ti statistics. In addition, the sample of ti statistics are mean adjusted. Kramer 
(2001) notes that this is to prevent the empirical distribution constructed from the ti 
statistics centring on the normalised value of the Z statistic. Using the sample of mean 
adjusted ti statistics, Kramer (2001) draws 1000 samples via replacement. This author 
recommends the use of this sample size because the generation of larger sample sizes 
hardly affects the results. Kramer (2001) calculates a normalised Z statistic for each 
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bootstrapped sample and constructs an empirical distribution function from these values. 
Kramer (2001) then compares the Z statistic determined from the empirical data set to the 
critical values from the empirical distribution function and makes inferences about the 
extent of the bias present in the test statistic.  
As shown by the level of skewness and kurtosis of the share returns appearing in Table 
3.4 of the preceding chapter, such share returns do not follow a normal distribution. As 
such, possible bias may exist in the test statistic, thus detracting from the accuracy of the 
statistical significance of the CAARs. In order to test the robustness of the CAAR test 
statistic, a data-based bootstrapping procedure, adapted from Serra (2002), is applied. 
This method is preferred to the Kramer (2001) test-statistic based approach, as the latter 
is only applicable when the statistical significance on an event is determined in a MVRM 
framework, while this study makes use of the CAAR framework of MacKinlay (1997).   
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Table 4.4: Event date CAAR significance 
 
Bidder Target
Target EXCL 
TARP
Expansion 
(Bidder)
Expansion 
(Target)
Recession 
(Bidder)
Recession 
(Target)
Recession 
(Target) EXCL 
TARP
Panel A: Model 1
(-5,+5) 1 1 1 1 1 N/A 1 1
(-10,+10) N/A 1 1 10 5 N/A 5 N/A
(-5,+24) 1 1 1 1 1 N/A 5 5
Panel B: Model 2
(-5,+5) 1 5 5 1 1 N/A 1 1
(-10,+10) 1 1 1 1 5 N/A N/A 10
(-5,+24) 1 1 N/A 1 1 N/A 5 5
Panel C: Model 3
(-5,+5) 1 1 1 1 N/A 1 1 1
(-10,+10) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(-5,+24) 1 1 1 1 N/A 1 1 1  
Note: 1, 5 and 10 denote an event date with statistically significant CAARs at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Event dates which do not 
contain statistically significant CAARs are denoted by N/A 
 
. 
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The procedure used in this study consists of the following steps: 
1.Determine AAR for all shares on the event day (τ = 0). This step is repeated for all 
days preceding the event date within the estimation window in order to determine 
a CAAR whose significance is tested using MacKinlay’s CAAR test statistic. The 
estimation and event windows are chosen from Well (2006) owing to the small 
size, thus allowing the minimisation of the effect other variables may have on 
share and market return data. 
2.The following steps are repeated 1000 times. 
a.N observations are randomly drawn from a normal distribution, where N is 
equal to the number of firms in the sample. Normal distribution is used 
since the test statistic under the null is assumed to be normal. Pop Tools
8
 is 
used to generate the simulated sample owing to the deficiencies in 
Microsoft Excel’s® random number generator.  
b.For each sample the AAR is calculated in the same way as done in Step 1.   
3.For each day preceding the event, Step 2 is repeated.  
4.The AARs produced for each day are summated to determine the CAAR.   
5.The shift method is used in order to make inferences about the extent of bias in the 
test statistic. This is done in the same way as was computed for Serra (2002).  
6.The result in Step 4 is compared with the test statistic in Step 1 in order to 
determine if the empirical value (Step 1) over- or underestimates the statistical 
significance determined by MacKinlay’s CAAR test statistic when compared to 
bootstrapped results (Step 4).    
                                                 
8
 Available at http://www.cse.csiro.au/poptools/  
60 
7.The above steps are repeated for all three market return models.  
In Model 1, the AAR on the event day for 41 firms (N = 41) is calculated at ‒0.09%. The 
foregoing procedure is repeated for all 5 days, which yields an event day CAAR of 
0.48%. When MacKinlay’s (1997) t-statistic is calculated, the null hypothesis of no 
CAARs on the event date is rejected at the 5% level of statistical significance. By 
conducting Step 2 above the bootstrapped sample, CAAR is ‒0.02%, which implies that 
the criterion value is 0.47%. Only two AARs in the 1000 event day (τ = 0) samples are 
greater than the criterion value. By substitution in equation (4.1), the null hypothesis of 
no CAAR on the event date is rejected at the 1% level. Thus the AAR generated by 
Model 1 underestimate the significance that the M&A had on CAARs on the event day 
by 2.43% points. For shareholders, the M&A has a greater effect on the share price of 
either the bidder or target firms, however, whether the effect is positive or negative in 
relation to shareholder wealth is undetermined.  
Table 4.5: Model 1 ‒ bootstrap results 
Panel A: Empirical Event Day 
CAAR 0.48 
t-stat (2.32) 
p-value 0.02 
Panel B: Bootstrapped Sample 
CAAR 0.02 
Criterion Value 0.47% 
NS 1000 
η 2 
 
The ARs generated by Model 2 are similar to those in Model 1, as the null hypothesis of 
no CAAR on the event date is rejected at the 5% level. Thus, ARs generated by Model 2 
underestimate the statistical significance that the M&A had on CAARs on the event day 
by 25.1% points. The implications for shareholders are the same as above. Thus, when 
assessing the statistical significance of the CAARs in Model 1 and Model 2, the test static 
will tend to yield a Type II error where the null hypothesis is erroneously accepted.  
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Turning to the ARs obtained from Model 3, the results differ with the null hypothesis of 
no CAAR on the event date being accepted at the 10% level of statistical significance. 
Thus, ARs obtained from Model 3 overestimated the significance that the M&A had on 
CAARs on the event day by 50.05% points. Thus, when assessing the  statistical 
significance of CAARs in Model 3, the test static will tend to yield a Type I error where 
the null hypothesis is erroneously rejected.  
Table 4.6: Model 2 ‒ bootstrap results 
Panel A: Empirical Event Day  
CAAR 0.33 
t-stat (1.25) 
p-value 0.27 
Panel B: Bootstrapped Sample  
CAAR 0.01 
Criterion Value 0.35% 
NS 1000 
η 13 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the results from Model 3 tend to differ from those 
yielded by Model 1 and Model 2. This may be attributed to the downward bias in beta 
estimates owing to thin trading in the sample of bank’s shares.  
Table 4.7: Model 3 ‒ bootstrap results 
Panel A: Empirical Event Day  
CAAR -5.03 
t-stat (19.26) 
p-value 0.00 
Panel B: Bootstrapped Sample  
CAAR 0.01 
Criterion Value -5.02% 
NS 1000 
η 500 
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4.4 SEMI-STRONG MARKET EFFICIENCY  
The study of the CAARs earned or lost by shareholders of the bidder and target firms 
during an M&A can be extended to assess the speed at which the market accounts for 
new information relating to a firm. The previous section revealed that M&As can have a 
statistically significant effect on CAARs on the event date, however, the question still 
remains as to how quickly shareholders react to news of the M&A. Fama (1991) states 
that under the assumption of the SSME, all public information is instantly and accurately 
incorporated by the market and is reflected in the share price of the firm, thus 
shareholders cannot earn ARs or gain from holding shares to a greater extent than would 
have been obtained if the investment had been held via an exchange traded fund (ETF). 
Consistent with this idea, when new information about a firm, such as an M&A, is 
released to the public, shareholders should buy or sell shares in this company, thus 
incorporating such information into the share price.  
Therefore, on the day new information is made available (the event day), CAARs 
attributable to shareholders of the firms contained in the sample should be absent. By 
using a large sample of firms, which are affected by similar events, one can make 
inferences about the extent of SSME of the share exchange on which the share is traded. 
In order to determine if CAARs are present on the event day, the method as well as event 
and estimation window lengths follow MacKinlay (1997). Only markets where three or 
more share returns are sampled for the study of bidder and target CAARs are assessed. 
These include the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the NASDAQ, the Bombay Stock 
Exchange (BSE) and Euronext Paris. The bidder and target banks’ AAR and CAAR are 
plotted during the (‒20, +20) window and appear in Appendix C, Figures C1 to C3. 
Across all markets the existence of non-zero CAARs around the event date is observed. 
This contradicts SSME as no shareholders should earn ARs when new information is 
released because the market immediately incorporates this information into the share 
price. This finding implies that in share markets of both developed and developing 
countries the notion of the inability of shareholders to earn AR is rejected, as the rejection 
of the SSME occurs for both the BSE, representing the share exchange of a developing 
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country, and the NYSE, representing the share exchange of a developed country. In 
relation to the extent of the SSME of developing countries’ share markets, the rejection of 
the SSME is consistent with Yip (2009), who rejects the notion of SSME by assessing, 
from 2004 to 2008, the extent to which shareholders earn or lose ARs during the final 
dividend announcements of firms from multiple industries listed on the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE). Other authors find AARs on announcement days of firms listed 
on developing countries’ share exchanges. These include Odabasi (1998), who studied 
share market reactions to firms from multiple industries earning announcements from 
1992 to 1995 in the Istanbul stock market (ISM). The above articles thus provide an 
example of how the SSME can be tested using a share-specific event besides an M&A. 
In relation to the extent of the SSME of a developing country’s share markets, the 
rejection of the SSME is consistent with Von Gersdorff and Bacon (2009) who assessed 
the SSME for firms listed on the NYSE. However, events are sampled during a much 
shorter period (April 2007–August 2007) and use firms from multiple industries. 
McCluskey, Burton, Power and Sinclair (2006) concur by rejecting the notion of SMEE 
when analysing the extent to which shareholders earned ARs during the final dividend 
announcements of firms from multiple industries listed on the Dublin Stock Exchange 
(DSE) during the 1987‒2001 period. Other authors that use the event study method to 
determine if shareholders earn or lose AARs on announcement days of firms listed on 
developed countries’ share exchanges include Barnes (1985) on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) and Samitas and Kenourgios (2004) on Athens Stock Exchange (ASE).  
Turning to the ability of share markets to incorporate new information, more than four-
fifths of equity market/model combinations may be efficient two days after the M&A, as 
shareholders’ CAARs approach zero through the purchase or sale of shares by 
shareholders. Thus, share prices take, on average, two days before they represent all 
publicly available information. Shareholders are relatively slow to buy or sell shares 
when information in relation to an M&A is released. An explanation of this phenomenon 
relates to that fact that M&As are often complex deals where several elements, such as 
the purchase price, the means of financing (shares, cash or combination of the two) and 
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which divisions of the target company are to be purchased, can all affect the future 
operating performance of the new entity. Certain examples exist of shareholders taking 
longer than two days to incorporate new information. The BSE may be efficient three 
days after an M&A while using Model 3 to estimate CAAR (Panel A, Figure C3). 
4.5 RESEARCH PROSPECTS 
The above study suffers from several deficiencies that detract from the results observed. 
In relation to data, the sample size of firms is relatively small, particularly in terms of 
M&As that occurred during periods of real economic contraction where only three 
bidders and two targets were assessed. The reason for the small sample size is related to 
many identified banks sampled from the period of real economic contraction containing 
firm-specific events besides the M&A. These events included bankruptcy or the 
announcement that the bank was to receive TARP funds. In addition, two-thirds of 
bidding banks and all target banks were sampled from the Subprime Crisis of 2008 to 
2009. Thus, the result produced may be specific to the sample period of the study. 
Expanding the research to include a variety of periods characterised by real economic 
contraction would enable a much broader view of the study and mitigate against any 
factors affecting the results that are specific to the time period. The data used in the study 
was observed as being non-normally distributed. As such, a possible extension would be 
to incorporate a non-parametric test of statistical significance to compare with the CAAR 
test statistic of MacKinlay (1997). This would provide a useful comparison of the two 
methods and supply insights into which provides the most reliable results in the face of 
non-normality.  
Turning to the models used to estimate non-event returns, no adjustment, as mentioned in 
Bradfield (2003), is made with regards to the β used in Model 3. As such, comparisons 
made between Model 3 and Model 1 and Model 2 are relatively limited as the parameters 
mentioned in Model 3 exhibit a great degree of bias, as mentioned above. In terms of 
Model 2, the market index used comprises a variety of firms from different industries. 
Thus market-wide changes in the share prices of firms listed on the exchange may have 
been taken into account when calculating the ARs earned or lost by shareholders. The 
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ability of this market return to represent movements of the share prices during the non-
merger period is thus limited. A possible improvement would be to include an index 
which represents the financial industry specifically. This would provide a much more 
accurate view of the movements of the share price in order to assess any returns that may 
be considered abnormal. This study makes use of three models, however, a fourth model 
could have been used that takes into account skewness preference in the measurement of 
ARs. This type of model is used by Mishra, Prakash and Karels (2003). The authors 
mention that this type of model can significantly change the results of the ARs measured 
when compared to models that do not. The inclusion of such a model could thus provide 
additional insights into the findings of this study. 
In relation to the ARs measured, a possible bias is noted by Moeller et al. (2005), who 
state that ARs earned by shareholders of the bidding firm tend to be greater for bidder 
firms with greater market capitalisation than for bidding firms whose market 
capitalisation is smaller. As such, Moeller et al. (2005) make use of value-weighted share 
returns, where the share price is divided by the market capitalisation of the firm. Through 
this Moeller et al. (2005) are able to assess the ARs attributable to the bidder firm’s 
shareholders during an M&A. An amendment such as this could provide an interesting 
comparison with the ARs produced in this study and add credibility to the results 
produced.  
Turning to the periods of real economic growth and contraction, no lagged figures were 
made use of. Thus, the study determines the effects of the state of the economy on the 
shareholder returns during the quarter during which either real economic growth or 
contraction is recorded. A possible improvement would be to incorporate a lagged effect 
and as such measure the ARs those shareholders of bidding and target firms earn or lose 
one quarter after the two consecutive quarters of real economic expansion or contraction. 
In such cases one can compare the results and determine whether the effects that the 
recession had on the shareholders’ ARs is still present even though the economy is in a 
period of real economic expansion.  
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Given the definition of the economic state of the country, this can be expanded to include 
elements that are more specific to the banking industry and thus have a much greater 
effect on the earnings of banks. This includes elements such as real domestic interest 
rates or business and household credit demand. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
In the years preceding the Subprime Crisis, global M&A volumes were on the rise 
(Dealogic, 2010). The financial sector contributed to the increase in M&A volumes 
owing to the promotion of a unified banking sector by regulators, as well the push by 
managers to enhance operational efficiency, consolidate market share and promote 
geographical diversification. In 2009, the Subprime Crisis resulted in the financial sector 
representing the greatest contributor to global M&A volumes. This result was due to the 
crisis itself and the state of the economy at the time. As such, a change in economic state 
can have a great affect on the decisions of managers to engage in M&A activity. In 
addition, controversy exists as to the ARs attributable to shareholders of bidding and 
target firms when an M&A occurs, with examples being shown where both bidder and 
target firms shareholders gain or lose in an M&A.  The controversy continues with 
regards to the choice of method applied to determine the ARs, with both market and 
accounting data methods having apparent benefits and flaws.  
The aim of the study is to establish what the overriding opinion in literature is as to the 
affects of M&As on the bidder and target firms shareholders’ returns respectively, and to 
determine if these results change during periods of real economic expansion and 
contraction. With regards to the literature, the findings suggest that on average 
shareholders of the bidding firm consider M&As to be a wealth-destroying event with a 
decrease in the share price being observed. For target firms’ shareholders the opposite 
occurs, with M&As being considered to be a wealth-creating event with an increase in the 
share price being observed. However, when these results are split per economic period 
the result observed differ.  
The results obtained indicate that shareholders of bidding firms during periods of real 
economic growth and contraction consider an M&A to be a wealth-destroying event 
where their CAAR is characterised by a negative value. In relation to target firms’ 
shareholders, M&As are considered to be a wealth-creating event when the M&As 
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occurred during a period of real economic expansion. However, for periods of real 
economic contraction, the AR of target firms’ shareholder differ with an M&A being 
considered to be a wealth-destroying event owing to their CAARs being characterised by 
a negative value. Thus, the state of the economy can have an effect on whether an M&A 
is considered to be wealth-creating or wealth-destroying for the target firms’ 
shareholders.  
In this study, several methods where applied to determine the AR attributable to 
shareholders, namely Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3. With regards to Model 1 and 
Model 2, the results produced were similar in terms of the wealth implications of M&As, 
as well as in terms of whether the M&A had a statically significant effect on the CAARs 
of the bidder and target firms.  However, for Model 3 the results were largely different. A 
possible explanation for this is the bias in beta estimates that thin trading can cause. As 
such, when measuring AR in Model 3, adjustments such as those done in Dimson and 
Marsh (1983) are advocated. In addition, a fourth model could have been used that takes 
into account skewness preference in the measurement of ARs. This type of model is 
detailed by Mishra et al. (2003) and could provide additional insights into the findings of 
this study. In relation to the test statistic applied in the study, the effects of non-normality 
in the data are observed as the test statistic underestimates the significance of the CAARs 
in Model 1 and Model 2 and overestimates the significance of the CAARs in Model 3. 
Given this, a non-parametric test statistic may be more useful with regards to event 
studies given the non-normal distribution of share returns. 
In relation to SSME, the findings contained in this study reject the SSME for all markets 
analysed. Share prices are found to take, on average, one day before they represent all 
publicly available information. Thus, shareholders are relatively slow to buy or sell 
shares when information in relation to an M&A is released. This conclusion is possibly 
related to the complex nature of such deals. In relation to the markets of developed and 
developing countries, no distinction in the results is observed. Thus, shareholders of 
banks domiciled in developed and developing countries can earn ARs when an M&A is 
announced.  
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The findings contained in this study should be interpreted with caution. One notes that the 
sample size of firms measured is rather low and only sampled during similar periods of 
real economic expansion and contraction. As such, increasing this time period would 
enable a much broader view of the study and mitigate against any factors affecting the 
results which are specific to the time period. The definition of the economic state could 
also be expanded to include elements that are more specific to the banking industry and 
thus have a much greater effect on the earnings of banks. This includes elements such as 
real domestic interest rates and business and household credit demand. Expanding the 
study across a larger time period and incorporating other industries will help to increase 
the sample size and make the results more applicable in terms of the broader economy. In 
addition to the deficiencies of the paper, the comparison of market models is limited 
owing to the lack of betas used which contained an adjustment for thin trading. In this 
case the amount of inference made from the ARs produced is limited.  
In summary, the state of the economy can have a significant affect on a firm’s decision to 
engage in M&A activity. In addition, the economic state can have an effect on the ARs 
attributable to the shareholders of bidding and target firms involved in M&As. This result 
is, however, specific to the banking industry and M&As that occurred during the first 
decade of the twenty-first century. The above findings have important implications for 
the short-term investing strategies of shareholders, as the state of an economy during an 
M&A can affect average ARs considerably.  
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APPENDIX A 
Table A1 Literature Review Table 
 
Bidder Target
LUBATKIN 1983 1
Address  why firms merge, if 
the merger provides any 
benefit and why empirical 
studies are to the contrary
3 N/A 0 N/A
ECKBO 1983 0 USA USA 1963-1978
Assess whether horizontal 
mergers generate returns for 
bidding and target firms
1 0 1 1
BARNES 1984 0 UK UK 1974-1976
Assess the benefits of 
merger activity to the 
bidding firm's shareholders 
and determine to what 
degree the efficient  market 
hypothesis can be used to 
interpret these results
1 0 0 N/A
DODDS and 
QUEK
1985 0 UK UK 1974-1976
Determine the effects on the 
share price of acquiring UK 
construction firms
1 0 0 N/A
MIKKELSON 
and RUBACK
1985 0 USA USA 1978-1980
Measure the effects on stock 
prices of corporate 
investments in another 
company 
1 0 2 1
DENNIS and 
McCONNELL
1986 0 USA USA 1962-1980
Determine the degree to 
which the retruns 
attributable to a merger 
differ amoung different 
kinds of securities
1 0 1 1
Empirical Target 
Outcome (profit = 1, loss 
= 0, inconclusive = 2, 
neither = 3)
Aim
Method  (semi-
parametric = 0, 
parametric = 1, non-
parametric = 2, other 
= 3)
Data (Market = 0, 
Accounting = 1)
Empirical Bidder 
Outcome ( loss = 0, 
profit = 1, 
inconclusive = 2, 
neither = 3)
Country
N/A
Author Date
Hybrid = 2 , 
Theoretical = 1, 
Empirical = 0 
Period
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Bidder Target
JAMES and 
WIER
1987 0 USA unspecified 1972-1983
Examine the extent to which 
competition in the market 
for bank acquisitions effects 
the returns on the acquirer's 
share price
1 0 1 N/A
BRADLEY, 
DESAI and KIM
1988 0 USA USA 1963-1984
Assess the synergistic gains 
from corporate acquisitions
1 0 1 (aggregate view) 1
JARRELL and 
POULSEN 
1989 0 unspecified unspecified 1963-1986
Determine the returns to 
acquiring and target firm's 
shareholders when tender 
offers are tabled
1,2 0 1 1
ASQUITH, 
BRUNER and 
MULLINS
1990 0 USA USA 1975-1983
Determine if the form of 
financing used in a deal and 
the size of respective firms 
explain abnormal retuns
1 0
1 for cash deals, 0 for 
equity
2
CHOI 1991 0 USA USA 1982-1985
Determine whether toehold 
acquisitions facilitate value 
enhancing control transfers
1 0 N/A N/A
FRANKS, 
HARRIS and 
TITMAN
1991 0 USA USA 1975-1984
Determine the post merger  
share price performance of 
acquiring frims 
1 0 1 N/A
Author Date
Hybrid = 2 , 
Theoretical = 1, 
Empirical = 0 
Empirical Target 
Outcome (profit = 1, loss 
= 0, inconclusive = 2, 
neither = 3)
Country
Period Aim
Method  (semi-
parametric = 0, 
parametric = 1, non-
parametric = 2, other 
= 3)
Data (Market = 0, 
Accounting = 1)
Empirical Bidder 
Outcome ( loss = 0, 
profit = 1, 
inconclusive = 2, 
neither = 3)
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Bidder Target
HEALY, PALEPU 
and RUBACK
1992 0 USA unspecified 1979-1983
Determine the post merger  
operating performance of 
merged firms
1, 2 0 1 N/A
KANG 1993 0 Japan, USA Japan, USA 1975-1988
Determine if bidder specific 
characteristics and exchange 
rate movements are useful in 
explaining cross-sectional 
variation in abnormal 
returns
0,1 0,1 2 1
HOUSTON and 
RYNGAERT
1994 0 USA USA 1985-1991
Analyse the gains to 
shareholders during banking 
M&A and assess which 
merger characteristics the 
market perceives as most 
valuable 
1 0,1 0 1
ZHANG 1995 0 USA USA 1980-1990
Determine if bank mergers 
are wealth creating and 
assess what are the potential 
sources for these gains 
1 0,1
PILLOFF 1996 0 USA USA 1982-1991
Determine the effect that 
mergers have on bank 
performance and 
shareholder wealth 
0,1 0,1
MAQUIEIRA,  
MEGGINSON and 
NAIL
1998 0 USA USA 1963-1996
Examine the effect of stock-
for-stock mergers on the 
publicly traded debt/equity 
instruments of  firms 
involved
1,2 0 1 1
RAU and 
VERMAELEN
1998 0 USA USA 1980-1991
Determine if bidders in 
mergers under-perform 
while bidders in tender 
offers over-perform the 
Market Index 
1 1,0
1 for tender offer, 0 for 
merger
N/A
Method  (semi-
parametric = 0, 
parametric = 1, non-
parametric = 2, other 
= 3)
Data (Market = 0, 
Accounting = 1)
Empirical Bidder 
Outcome ( loss = 0, 
profit = 1, 
inconclusive = 2, 
neither = 3)
Empirical Target 
Outcome (profit = 1, loss 
= 0, inconclusive = 2, 
neither = 3)
Author Date
Hybrid = 2 , 
Theoretical = 1, 
Empirical = 0 
Country
Period Aim
1 (aggregate view)
0,1 (aggregate view)
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Bidder Target
MAHONEY and 
WEINSTEIN
1999 0 unspecified USA 1975-1991
 Determine the effect of 
access to appraisal on target 
shareholder gains from 
acquisitions
1 0 N/A 2
BECHER 2000 0 unspecified unspecified 1980-1997
Assess if mergers are wealth 
creating. Determine if 
mergers occurring during the 
90's differ from those in the 
80's
1,2 0 2 1
ANDRADE, 
MITCHELL and 
STAFFORD
2001 0
Provide  evidence on 
debates around mergers such 
as profitability and why they 
occur 
3 N/A N/A N/A
HOUSTON, JAMES 
and RYNGAERT
2001 0 USA USA 1985-1996
Determine the stock value 
bank mergers create
1 0 0 1
FULLER,  NETTER 
and 
STEGEMOLLER
2002 0 USA unspecified 1990-2000
Determine the impact on 
shareholder returns for firms 
that acquired five or more 
public, private, and/or 
subsidiary targets within a 
short time period
1 0 2 2
DELONG 2003 0
USA, Non-USA 
(unspecified)
USA, Non-USA 
(unspecified)
1988-1999
Analyse if market reactions 
to non-US bank mergers  are 
similar to the reaction in the 
US
1 0
2 for Non-USA, 0 for 
USA
1 for Non-USA, 1 for USA
CAMPA and 
HERNANDO
2004 0 European European 1998-2000
Determine the effect of 
M&As on the value of 
shareholders stock 
1 0 1,0 1,0
Method  (semi-
parametric = 0, 
parametric = 1, non-
parametric = 2, other 
= 3)
Data (Market = 0, 
Accounting = 1)
Empirical Bidder 
Outcome ( loss = 0, 
profit = 1, 
inconclusive = 2, 
neither = 3)
Empirical Target 
Outcome (profit = 1, loss 
= 0, inconclusive = 2, 
neither = 3)
Author Date
Hybrid = 2 , 
Theoretical = 1, 
Empirical = 0 
Country
Period Aim
N/A
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Bidder Target
MOELLER, 
SCHLINGEMANN 
and STULZ
2005 0 USA USA 1980-2001
Determine the post merger  
share price performance of 
acquiring firms 
1,2 0 0 N/A
KARCESKI, 
ONGENA and SMITH
2005 0 Norway Norway 1983-2000
Assess the impact of bank 
consolidations on 
commercial borrowers
1 0 1 0
WELL 2006 0
Scandanavia, 
Iceland
Scandanavia, 
Iceland, Baltic
1999-2000
Provide further empirical 
evidence on merger gains in 
the financial services 
industry
1 0 2 1
LORENZ and 
SCHIERECK
2007 0 European European 1990-2002
Compares the implications 
to shareholder wealth of 
completed vs. uncompleted 
banking M&A
1 0 0 1
ALTUNBAS and 
MARQUES
2008 0
EU (27 
countries)
EU (27 
countries)
1992-2001
Role of strategic similarities 
on two year post M&A 
financial performance of 
European banks
0 0,1 1 N/A
BETZER, GOERGEN 
and METZGER
2009 0 USA USA 1989-2003
Using acquisition  motives 
to determine positive or 
negative abnoraml stock 
performance
0,1 0,1 2 2
RAMAKRISHNAN 2010 0 India India 1996-2002
Determine the effect on 
shareholder wealth of 
merger announcements of 
Indian firms
1 0 3 1
Method  (semi-
parametric = 0, 
parametric = 1, non-
parametric = 2, other 
= 3)
Data (Market = 0, 
Accounting = 1)
Empirical Bidder 
Outcome ( loss = 0, 
profit = 1, 
inconclusive = 2, 
neither = 3)
Empirical Target 
Outcome (profit = 1, loss 
= 0, inconclusive = 2, 
neither = 3)
Author Date
Hybrid = 2 , 
Theoretical = 1, 
Empirical = 0 
Country
Period Aim
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Table B1.1 Model 1 CAAR, test statistic and p-value during event window (-5,+5) 
 
Days CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value
-5 0.05 0.37 0.72 0.44 1.15 0.28 0.34 0.91 0.39 0.23 1.54 0.15
-4 0.17 1.16 0.27 0.54 1.41 0.19 0.70 1.87 0.09 0.27 1.78 0.11
-3 0.16 1.10 0.30 0.99 2.61 0.03 1.20 3.20 0.01 0.19 1.29 0.23
-2 0.17 1.13 0.29 1.02 2.69 0.02 1.35 3.62 0.00 0.16 1.09 0.30
-1 0.03 0.18 0.86 1.45 3.79 0.00 1.32 3.54 0.01 0.14 0.94 0.37
0 -1.02 -6.95 0.00 2.83 7.43 0.00 3.21 8.59 0.00 -1.12 -7.45 0.00
+1 -0.60 -4.13 0.00 2.40 6.30 0.00 2.75 7.37 0.00 -0.66 -4.43 0.00
+2 -0.62 -4.22 0.00 2.74 7.18 0.00 3.10 8.29 0.00 -0.58 -3.90 0.00
+3 -0.41 -2.79 0.02 2.37 6.21 0.00 3.01 8.07 0.00 -0.13 -0.84 0.42
+4 -0.35 -2.42 0.04 2.24 5.89 0.00 2.85 7.62 0.00 0.03 0.21 0.83
+5 -0.34 -2.29 0.04 2.88 7.56 0.00 3.15 8.42 0.00 0.11 0.72 0.49
Days CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value
-5 0.41 1.61 0.14 -1.24 -2.07 0.07 0.67 0.28 0.79 -0.59 -0.14 0.89
-4 1.02 4.05 0.00 -0.54 -0.90 0.39 -2.84 -1.16 0.27 -3.79 -0.88 0.40
-3 1.38 5.50 0.00 -0.07 -0.12 0.90 -1.71 -0.70 0.50 -1.40 -0.33 0.75
-2 1.54 6.15 0.00 0.18 0.30 0.77 -2.61 -1.07 0.31 -1.36 -0.32 0.76
-1 1.62 6.46 0.00 -0.82 -1.36 0.20 0.21 0.09 0.93 -2.84 -0.66 0.52
0 4.41 17.58 0.00 -0.28 -0.47 0.65 -8.24 -3.38 0.01 -13.65 -3.18 0.01
+1 3.90 15.53 0.00 -0.17 -0.28 0.78 -8.08 -3.32 0.01 -13.31 -3.10 0.01
+2 4.08 16.23 0.00 -0.87 -1.45 0.18 -6.63 -2.72 0.02 -10.64 -2.48 0.03
+3 4.05 16.12 0.00 -2.48 -4.13 0.00 -9.40 -3.86 0.00 -11.45 -2.66 0.02
+4 3.83 15.25 0.00 -3.19 -5.31 0.00 -8.85 -3.63 0.00 -10.90 -2.54 0.03
+5 3.83 15.26 0.00 -3.59 -5.98 0.00 -3.75 -1.54 0.16 -6.45 -1.50 0.16
Contraction (Target) Contraction (Target) EXCL TARP
Bidder Target Target EXCL TARP Expansion (Bidder)
Expansion (Target) Contraction (Bidder)
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Table B1.2 Model 1 CAAR, test statistic and p-value during event window (-
10,+10)
Days CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value
-10 -0.38 -2.72 0.71 0.32 1.01 0.33 0.34 1.14 0.27 -0.39 -2.76 0.70
-9 -0.60 -4.32 0.56 0.43 1.37 0.19 0.47 1.57 0.13 -0.41 -2.89 0.68
-8 -0.63 -4.54 0.54 1.82 5.77 0.00 1.71 5.78 0.00 -0.48 -3.39 0.63
-7 -0.40 -2.91 0.69 1.48 4.71 0.00 1.80 6.07 0.00 -0.36 -2.53 0.72
-6 -0.60 -4.34 0.55 1.53 4.86 0.00 1.97 6.64 0.00 -0.67 -4.71 0.51
-5 -0.55 -3.95 0.59 1.97 6.26 0.00 2.31 7.78 0.00 -0.44 -3.09 0.66
-4 -0.43 -3.12 0.67 2.07 6.57 0.00 2.67 8.99 0.00 -0.41 -2.85 0.69
-3 -0.44 -3.18 0.66 2.53 8.02 0.00 3.16 10.67 0.00 -0.48 -3.36 0.64
-2 -0.44 -3.15 0.67 2.56 8.11 0.00 3.32 11.19 0.00 -0.51 -3.57 0.62
-1 -0.58 -4.15 0.57 2.98 9.45 0.00 3.29 11.10 0.00 -0.53 -3.72 0.60
0 -1.62 -11.67 0.12 4.37 13.85 0.00 5.18 17.46 0.00 -1.79 -12.52 0.09
+1 -1.21 -8.69 0.24 3.94 12.48 0.00 4.72 15.91 0.00 -1.34 -9.35 0.20
+2 -1.22 -8.80 0.24 4.27 13.55 0.00 5.06 17.07 0.00 -1.26 -8.79 0.22
+3 -1.01 -7.28 0.32 3.90 12.37 0.00 4.98 16.80 0.00 -0.80 -5.59 0.43
+4 -0.96 -6.90 0.35 3.78 11.98 0.00 4.82 16.24 0.00 -0.64 -4.49 0.53
+5 -0.94 -6.76 0.36 4.42 14.01 0.00 5.12 17.24 0.00 -0.57 -3.95 0.58
+6 -0.90 -6.46 0.38 4.43 14.06 0.00 4.82 16.25 0.00 -0.53 -3.72 0.60
+7 -1.01 -7.31 0.32 4.64 14.71 0.00 5.05 17.02 0.00 -0.54 -3.80 0.59
+8 -0.82 -5.92 0.42 4.77 15.14 0.00 5.13 17.30 0.00 -0.42 -2.96 0.68
+9 -1.19 -8.61 0.25 4.72 14.98 0.00 5.20 17.52 0.00 -0.69 -4.82 0.50
+10 -0.99 -7.13 0.33 3.80 12.07 0.00 4.94 16.64 0.00 -0.42 -2.92 0.68
Days CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value
-10 0.55 0.25 0.81 -0.25 -0.44 0.80 -1.30 -0.73 0.47 -2.63 -0.97 0.34
-9 0.59 0.27 0.79 -1.97 -3.43 0.06 -0.70 -0.39 0.70 -1.32 -0.49 0.63
-8 0.99 0.45 0.66 -1.70 -2.96 0.10 7.63 4.26 0.00 11.88 4.39 0.00
-7 0.70 0.32 0.75 -0.71 -1.24 0.49 6.98 3.90 0.00 17.23 6.37 0.00
-6 1.14 0.52 0.61 -0.08 -0.14 0.94 4.31 2.41 0.03 13.62 5.03 0.00
-5 1.54 0.70 0.49 -1.32 -2.30 0.20 4.98 2.78 0.01 13.03 4.82 0.00
-4 2.16 0.98 0.34 -0.62 -1.08 0.54 1.47 0.82 0.42 9.83 3.64 0.00
-3 2.52 1.14 0.27 -0.15 -0.27 0.88 2.60 1.45 0.16 12.22 4.52 0.00
-2 2.68 1.22 0.24 0.10 0.17 0.92 1.70 0.95 0.35 12.26 4.53 0.00
-1 2.76 1.25 0.23 -0.90 -1.56 0.38 4.52 2.52 0.02 10.78 3.98 0.00
0 5.55 2.52 0.02 -0.36 -0.63 0.72 -3.93 -2.20 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.99
+1 5.04 2.28 0.03 -0.25 -0.43 0.81 -3.78 -2.11 0.05 0.30 0.11 0.91
+2 5.21 2.36 0.03 -0.95 -1.65 0.35 -2.33 -1.30 0.21 2.98 1.10 0.28
+3 5.18 2.35 0.03 -2.56 -4.46 0.02 -5.09 -2.84 0.01 2.17 0.80 0.43
+4 4.97 2.25 0.04 -3.27 -5.69 0.00 -4.54 -2.54 0.02 2.72 1.01 0.33
+5 4.97 2.25 0.04 -3.67 -6.39 0.00 0.56 0.31 0.76 7.17 2.65 0.02
+6 4.85 2.20 0.04 -3.57 -6.21 0.00 1.53 0.85 0.40 4.46 1.65 0.12
+7 5.00 2.27 0.03 -4.47 -7.79 0.00 2.09 1.16 0.26 5.70 2.11 0.05
+8 5.13 2.32 0.03 -3.75 -6.52 0.00 2.30 1.28 0.21 5.24 1.94 0.07
+9 5.10 2.31 0.03 -4.90 -8.53 0.00 2.10 1.17 0.26 6.62 2.45 0.02
+10 4.87 2.21 0.04 -5.18 -9.01 0.00 -3.63 -2.03 0.06 5.90 2.18 0.04
Contraction (Target) Contraction (Target) EXCL TARP
Bidder Target Target EXCL TARP Expansion (Bidder)
Expansion (Target) Contraction (Bidder)
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Table B1.3 Model 1 CAAR, test statistic and p-value during event window (-
5,+24)
Days CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value
-5 0.05 0.36 0.73 0.44 0.90 0.37 0.34 0.73 0.47 0.23 1.46 0.16
-4 0.17 1.11 0.28 0.54 1.10 0.28 0.70 1.50 0.14 0.27 1.68 0.10
-3 0.16 1.05 0.30 0.99 2.05 0.05 1.20 2.57 0.02 0.19 1.22 0.23
-2 0.17 1.08 0.29 1.02 2.11 0.04 1.35 2.90 0.01 0.16 1.03 0.31
-1 0.03 0.17 0.87 1.45 2.97 0.01 1.32 2.85 0.01 0.14 0.89 0.38
0 -1.02 -6.65 0.00 2.83 5.83 0.00 3.21 6.90 0.00 -1.12 -7.05 0.00
+1 -0.60 -3.95 0.00 2.40 4.94 0.00 2.75 5.92 0.00 -0.66 -4.18 0.00
+2 -0.62 -4.04 0.00 2.74 5.63 0.00 3.10 6.66 0.00 -0.58 -3.68 0.00
+3 -0.41 -2.67 0.01 2.37 4.87 0.00 3.01 6.48 0.00 -0.13 -0.79 0.43
+4 -0.35 -2.32 0.03 2.24 4.62 0.00 2.85 6.12 0.00 0.03 0.20 0.84
+5 -0.34 -2.20 0.04 2.88 5.93 0.00 3.15 6.76 0.00 0.11 0.68 0.50
+6 -0.29 -1.92 0.06 2.90 5.96 0.00 2.85 6.13 0.00 0.14 0.90 0.38
+7 -0.41 -2.70 0.01 3.11 6.39 0.00 3.08 6.62 0.00 0.13 0.82 0.42
+8 -0.22 -1.44 0.16 3.24 6.66 0.00 3.16 6.80 0.00 0.25 1.58 0.12
+9 -0.59 -3.87 0.00 3.19 6.56 0.00 3.23 6.94 0.00 -0.02 -0.10 0.92
+10 -0.39 -2.53 0.02 2.27 4.67 0.00 2.97 6.38 0.00 0.26 1.61 0.12
+11 -0.39 -2.55 0.02 2.71 5.57 0.00 2.94 6.32 0.00 0.48 3.04 0.00
+12 -0.24 -1.58 0.13 2.73 5.62 0.00 2.86 6.15 0.00 0.33 2.10 0.04
+13 -0.32 -2.11 0.04 2.37 4.87 0.00 2.60 5.59 0.00 0.13 0.81 0.42
+14 -0.89 -5.80 0.00 2.84 5.84 0.00 2.86 6.15 0.00 -0.07 -0.41 0.68
+15 -1.18 -7.71 0.00 2.76 5.68 0.00 2.74 5.90 0.00 -0.21 -1.35 0.19
+16 -1.06 -6.96 0.00 2.52 5.19 0.00 2.72 5.85 0.00 -0.12 -0.74 0.47
+17 -1.03 -6.71 0.00 2.42 4.99 0.00 2.62 5.63 0.00 0.11 0.72 0.47
+18 -0.67 -4.41 0.00 1.76 3.62 0.00 2.36 5.06 0.00 0.07 0.41 0.68
+19 -0.50 -3.25 0.00 2.11 4.34 0.00 2.61 5.62 0.00 0.14 0.87 0.39
+20 -0.78 -5.10 0.00 1.93 3.96 0.00 2.65 5.71 0.00 0.07 0.47 0.64
+21 -0.94 -6.17 0.00 2.94 6.06 0.00 3.35 7.21 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 0.94
+22 -0.77 -5.03 0.00 2.95 6.06 0.00 3.50 7.53 0.00 0.12 0.75 0.46
+23 -0.94 -6.15 0.00 3.04 6.25 0.00 3.55 7.62 0.00 0.11 0.71 0.48
+24 -1.18 -7.70 0.00 3.10 6.37 0.00 3.43 7.37 0.00 0.13 0.80 0.43
Bidder Target Target EXCL TARP Expansion (Bidder)
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Days CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value
-5 0.41 1.50 0.14 -1.24 -1.76 0.09 0.67 0.21 0.84 -0.59 -0.10 0.92
-4 1.02 3.77 0.00 -0.54 -0.77 0.45 -2.84 -0.87 0.39 -3.79 -0.66 0.52
-3 1.38 5.11 0.00 -0.07 -0.11 0.92 -1.71 -0.52 0.60 -1.40 -0.24 0.81
-2 1.54 5.72 0.00 0.18 0.25 0.80 -2.61 -0.80 0.43 -1.36 -0.24 0.81
-1 1.62 6.01 0.00 -0.82 -1.16 0.26 0.21 0.06 0.95 -2.84 -0.49 0.62
0 4.41 16.36 0.00 -0.28 -0.40 0.69 -8.24 -2.52 0.02 -13.65 -2.37 0.02
+1 3.90 14.45 0.00 -0.17 -0.24 0.81 -8.08 -2.48 0.02 -13.31 -2.32 0.03
+2 4.08 15.11 0.00 -0.87 -1.23 0.23 -6.63 -2.03 0.05 -10.64 -1.85 0.07
+3 4.05 15.00 0.00 -2.48 -3.51 0.00 -9.40 -2.88 0.01 -11.45 -1.99 0.06
+4 3.83 14.19 0.00 -3.19 -4.51 0.00 -8.85 -2.71 0.01 -10.90 -1.90 0.07
+5 3.83 14.20 0.00 -3.59 -5.08 0.00 -3.75 -1.15 0.26 -6.45 -1.12 0.27
+6 3.71 13.75 0.00 -3.49 -4.93 0.00 -2.78 -0.85 0.40 -9.16 -1.59 0.12
+7 3.87 14.33 0.00 -4.39 -6.21 0.00 -2.22 -0.68 0.50 -7.92 -1.38 0.18
+8 3.99 14.78 0.00 -3.67 -5.19 0.00 -2.01 -0.62 0.54 -8.38 -1.46 0.16
+9 3.96 14.67 0.00 -4.82 -6.82 0.00 -2.21 -0.68 0.50 -7.00 -1.22 0.23
+10 3.73 13.82 0.00 -5.10 -7.21 0.00 -7.94 -2.43 0.02 -7.72 -1.34 0.19
+11 3.66 13.57 0.00 -6.78 -9.59 0.00 -3.97 -1.21 0.23 -7.16 -1.25 0.22
+12 3.62 13.41 0.00 -4.45 -6.29 0.00 -3.48 -1.07 0.30 -7.78 -1.35 0.19
+13 3.44 12.76 0.00 -3.63 -5.14 0.00 -5.16 -1.58 0.12 -9.19 -1.60 0.12
+14 3.55 13.15 0.00 -6.91 -9.78 0.00 -2.13 -0.65 0.52 -6.79 -1.18 0.25
+15 3.53 13.10 0.00 -8.25 -11.67 0.00 -2.64 -0.81 0.42 -8.34 -1.45 0.16
+16 3.61 13.37 0.00 -8.01 -11.33 0.00 -5.08 -1.56 0.13 -9.70 -1.69 0.10
+17 3.67 13.62 0.00 -9.39 -13.28 0.00 -6.33 -1.94 0.06 -12.15 -2.11 0.04
+18 3.71 13.74 0.00 -6.10 -8.63 0.00 -11.88 -3.64 0.00 -16.59 -2.88 0.01
+19 4.12 15.27 0.00 -5.15 -7.28 0.00 -11.98 -3.67 0.00 -18.47 -3.21 0.00
+20 4.33 16.06 0.00 -7.05 -9.97 0.00 -14.94 -4.58 0.00 -20.86 -3.63 0.00
+21 4.75 17.59 0.00 -7.77 -11.00 0.00 -9.67 -2.96 0.01 -16.12 -2.80 0.01
+22 4.78 17.71 0.00 -7.28 -10.30 0.00 -9.89 -3.03 0.01 -14.40 -2.50 0.02
+23 4.90 18.17 0.00 -8.66 -12.25 0.00 -10.00 -3.06 0.00 -15.47 -2.69 0.01
+24 4.81 17.81 0.00 -10.74 -15.19 0.00 -8.88 -2.72 0.01 -15.89 -2.76 0.01
Contraction (Target) Contraction (Target) EXCL TARPExpansion (Target) Contraction (Bidder)
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Table B2.1 Model 2 CAAR, test statistic and p-value during event window (-5,+5) 
Days CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value
-5 -0.09 -0.46 0.66 0.19 0.43 0.85 0.22 0.50 0.83 0.09 0.44 0.67
-4 0.09 0.50 0.63 0.48 1.09 0.64 0.70 1.58 0.50 0.12 0.61 0.56
-3 -0.19 -1.02 0.33 0.80 1.82 0.44 1.08 2.45 0.31 -0.15 -0.77 0.46
-2 -0.35 -1.84 0.10 0.35 0.80 0.73 0.78 1.77 0.45 -0.30 -1.48 0.17
-1 -0.58 -3.08 0.01 0.90 2.04 0.39 1.04 2.36 0.32 -0.47 -2.31 0.04
0 -1.33 -7.03 0.00 2.73 6.21 0.02 3.20 7.26 0.01 -1.40 -6.94 0.00
+1 -0.95 -5.01 0.00 2.42 5.51 0.04 2.99 6.79 0.01 -0.99 -4.88 0.00
+2 -0.94 -4.94 0.00 2.54 5.78 0.03 3.18 7.21 0.01 -1.15 -5.69 0.00
+3 -0.78 -4.12 0.00 2.30 5.23 0.04 3.20 7.26 0.01 -0.75 -3.71 0.00
+4 -0.49 -2.58 0.03 2.26 5.15 0.05 3.31 7.50 0.01 -0.36 -1.78 0.10
+5 -0.50 -2.61 0.03 2.61 5.94 0.03 3.49 7.92 0.01 -0.36 -1.80 0.10
Days CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value
-5 0.27 0.90 0.79 -1.38 -2.08 0.06 -0.37 -0.15 0.72 -0.50 -0.11 0.63
-4 0.84 2.80 0.42 -0.11 -0.17 0.87 -2.04 -0.81 0.07 -1.31 -0.28 0.22
-3 1.15 3.83 0.28 -0.48 -0.73 0.48 -1.65 -0.66 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.94
-2 1.00 3.33 0.34 -0.71 -1.08 0.31 -4.19 -1.67 0.00 -2.25 -0.49 0.05
-1 1.32 4.39 0.22 -1.44 -2.18 0.05 -2.04 -0.81 0.07 -2.83 -0.61 0.02
0 4.49 14.97 0.00 -0.82 -1.24 0.24 -9.59 -3.81 0.00 -14.80 -3.19 0.00
+1 4.31 14.38 0.00 -0.67 -1.02 0.33 -10.85 -4.31 0.00 -15.50 -3.34 0.00
+2 3.98 13.26 0.00 0.63 0.95 0.37 -7.53 -2.99 0.00 -8.02 -1.73 0.00
+3 4.07 13.57 0.00 -1.00 -1.52 0.16 -10.11 -4.02 0.00 -8.95 -1.93 0.00
+4 4.04 13.47 0.00 -1.43 -2.16 0.06 -10.17 -4.04 0.00 -6.93 -1.50 0.00
+5 3.84 12.81 0.00 -1.46 -2.21 0.05 -6.03 -2.40 0.00 -1.45 -0.31 0.18
Contraction (Target)
Target EXCL TARP
Contraction (Target) EXCL TARP
Bidder Target Expansion (Bidder)
Expansion (Target) Contraction (Bidder)
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Table B2.2 Model 2 CAAR, test statistic and p-value during event window (-
10,+10)
Days CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value
-10 -0.34 -1.78 0.09 0.27 0.85 0.41 0.21 0.59 0.56 -0.31 -1.54 0.14
-9 -0.51 -2.67 0.01 0.45 1.43 0.17 0.36 1.03 0.31 -0.47 -2.29 0.03
-8 -0.45 -2.38 0.03 1.93 6.14 0.00 1.72 4.92 0.00 -0.42 -2.06 0.05
-7 -0.40 -2.12 0.05 1.48 4.70 0.00 1.56 4.46 0.00 -0.32 -1.60 0.13
-6 -0.49 -2.55 0.02 1.16 3.68 0.00 1.48 4.25 0.00 -0.61 -3.00 0.01
-5 -0.57 -3.01 0.01 1.36 4.30 0.00 1.71 4.89 0.00 -0.52 -2.57 0.02
-4 -0.39 -2.05 0.05 1.65 5.23 0.00 2.19 6.27 0.00 -0.49 -2.41 0.03
-3 -0.68 -3.57 0.00 1.97 6.26 0.00 2.57 7.38 0.00 -0.77 -3.78 0.00
-2 -0.84 -4.39 0.00 1.53 4.84 0.00 2.28 6.54 0.00 -0.91 -4.50 0.00
-1 -1.07 -5.62 0.00 2.08 6.59 0.00 2.55 7.29 0.00 -1.08 -5.33 0.00
0 -1.82 -9.55 0.00 3.91 12.41 0.00 4.71 13.50 0.00 -2.02 -9.94 0.00
+1 -1.44 -7.54 0.00 3.61 11.44 0.00 4.51 12.91 0.00 -1.60 -7.89 0.00
+2 -1.42 -7.47 0.00 3.73 11.83 0.00 4.69 13.45 0.00 -1.77 -8.70 0.00
+3 -1.27 -6.65 0.00 3.49 11.08 0.00 4.72 13.53 0.00 -1.37 -6.74 0.00
+4 -0.98 -5.12 0.00 3.46 10.98 0.00 4.83 13.85 0.00 -0.98 -4.82 0.00
+5 -0.98 -5.16 0.00 3.81 12.09 0.00 5.02 14.39 0.00 -0.98 -4.85 0.00
+6 -0.95 -4.96 0.00 3.85 12.20 0.00 4.57 13.08 0.00 -0.93 -4.59 0.00
+7 -1.21 -6.34 0.00 4.28 13.59 0.00 4.85 13.91 0.00 -1.10 -5.42 0.00
+8 -1.23 -6.48 0.00 4.14 13.12 0.00 4.62 13.23 0.00 -1.07 -5.25 0.00
+9 -1.63 -8.54 0.00 4.00 12.69 0.00 4.48 12.85 0.00 -1.33 -6.57 0.00
+10 -1.27 -6.68 0.00 3.33 10.57 0.00 4.46 12.77 0.00 -0.96 -4.72 0.00
Days CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value
-10 0.42 0.22 0.83 -0.53 -0.81 0.43 -0.82 -0.45 0.65 -2.83 -0.77 0.45
-9 0.13 0.07 0.95 -0.83 -1.26 0.22 2.68 1.48 0.15 3.55 0.97 0.34
-8 0.64 0.33 0.75 -0.72 -1.09 0.29 11.03 6.11 0.00 16.83 4.59 0.00
-7 0.36 0.18 0.86 -0.99 -1.50 0.15 9.38 5.19 0.00 18.39 5.01 0.00
-6 0.38 0.20 0.85 0.42 0.64 0.53 6.62 3.66 0.00 16.89 4.60 0.00
-5 0.66 0.34 0.74 -0.95 -1.44 0.17 6.22 3.44 0.00 16.35 4.45 0.00
-4 1.24 0.63 0.53 0.32 0.49 0.63 4.53 2.51 0.02 15.49 4.22 0.00
-3 1.56 0.80 0.43 -0.04 -0.07 0.95 4.89 2.70 0.01 16.83 4.59 0.00
-2 1.41 0.72 0.48 -0.27 -0.40 0.69 2.32 1.28 0.21 14.44 3.94 0.00
-1 1.74 0.89 0.38 -0.99 -1.50 0.15 4.44 2.46 0.02 13.82 3.77 0.00
0 4.92 2.52 0.02 -0.36 -0.55 0.59 -3.13 -1.73 0.10 1.80 0.49 0.63
+1 4.75 2.43 0.02 -0.21 -0.32 0.75 -4.41 -2.44 0.02 1.05 0.29 0.78
+2 4.42 2.27 0.03 1.10 1.66 0.11 -1.12 -0.62 0.54 8.48 2.31 0.03
+3 4.52 2.32 0.03 -0.53 -0.80 0.43 -3.73 -2.06 0.05 7.50 2.04 0.05
+4 4.50 2.31 0.03 -0.94 -1.43 0.17 -3.81 -2.11 0.05 9.47 2.58 0.02
+5 4.31 2.21 0.04 -0.97 -1.47 0.16 0.30 0.17 0.87 14.90 4.06 0.00
+6 4.01 2.05 0.05 -1.03 -1.57 0.13 2.73 1.51 0.15 12.39 3.38 0.00
+7 4.08 2.09 0.05 -1.99 -3.01 0.01 5.70 3.16 0.00 15.69 4.27 0.00
+8 4.00 2.05 0.05 -2.47 -3.74 0.00 5.07 2.81 0.01 13.19 3.59 0.00
+9 3.90 2.00 0.06 -3.78 -5.72 0.00 4.69 2.60 0.02 12.64 3.44 0.00
+10 3.81 1.95 0.06 -3.58 -5.43 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.99 13.47 3.67 0.00
Contraction (Bidder) Contraction (Target) Contraction (Target) EXCL TARP
Bidder Target Target EXCL TARP Expansion (Bidder)
Expansion (Target)
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Table B2.3 Model 2 CAAR, test statistic and p-value during event window (-
5,+25)
Days CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value
-5 -0.08 -0.44 0.66 0.21 0.38 0.71 0.24 0.12 0.90 0.10 0.52 0.61
-4 0.11 0.58 0.56 0.53 0.93 0.36 0.74 0.38 0.71 0.15 0.75 0.46
-3 -0.18 -0.95 0.35 0.87 1.55 0.13 1.15 0.59 0.56 -0.12 -0.59 0.56
-2 -0.32 -1.77 0.09 0.45 0.79 0.44 0.88 0.45 0.66 -0.25 -1.26 0.22
-1 -0.55 -3.01 0.01 1.02 1.80 0.08 1.16 0.59 0.56 -0.40 -2.05 0.05
0 -1.30 -7.05 0.00 2.88 5.09 0.00 3.35 1.70 0.10 -1.33 -6.73 0.00
+1 -0.91 -4.93 0.00 2.59 4.59 0.00 3.16 1.61 0.12 -0.90 -4.55 0.00
+2 -0.89 -4.83 0.00 2.73 4.84 0.00 3.37 1.72 0.10 -1.05 -5.32 0.00
+3 -0.73 -3.94 0.00 2.52 4.46 0.00 3.42 1.74 0.09 -0.64 -3.23 0.00
+4 -0.43 -2.32 0.03 2.51 4.44 0.00 3.55 1.81 0.08 -0.23 -1.19 0.25
+5 -0.43 -2.32 0.03 2.88 5.09 0.00 3.76 1.91 0.07 -0.22 -1.14 0.26
+6 -0.38 -2.09 0.05 2.93 5.19 0.00 3.32 1.69 0.10 -0.16 -0.81 0.42
+7 -0.64 -3.48 0.00 3.39 6.00 0.00 3.63 1.85 0.07 -0.31 -1.60 0.12
+8 -0.66 -3.59 0.00 3.26 5.78 0.00 3.42 1.74 0.09 -0.27 -1.35 0.19
+9 -1.05 -5.69 0.00 3.15 5.57 0.00 3.30 1.68 0.10 -0.52 -2.64 0.01
+10 -0.69 -3.73 0.00 2.50 4.43 0.00 3.30 1.68 0.10 -0.13 -0.66 0.52
+11 -0.82 -4.47 0.00 2.74 4.86 0.00 3.33 1.69 0.10 -0.02 -0.09 0.93
+12 -0.75 -4.09 0.00 2.84 5.03 0.00 3.21 1.63 0.11 -0.18 -0.90 0.37
+13 -0.76 -4.13 0.00 2.67 4.72 0.00 3.07 1.56 0.13 -0.21 -1.09 0.29
+14 -1.35 -7.34 0.00 3.17 5.62 0.00 3.45 1.75 0.09 -0.52 -2.63 0.01
+15 -1.54 -8.35 0.00 3.38 5.98 0.00 3.52 1.79 0.08 -0.46 -2.32 0.03
+16 -1.57 -8.54 0.00 2.98 5.28 0.00 3.22 1.64 0.11 -0.46 -2.31 0.03
+17 -1.41 -7.67 0.00 2.93 5.18 0.00 3.23 1.64 0.11 -0.10 -0.52 0.61
+18 -1.12 -6.06 0.00 2.08 3.69 0.00 2.73 1.39 0.18 -0.20 -1.02 0.32
+19 -1.07 -5.81 0.00 1.91 3.39 0.00 2.51 1.28 0.21 -0.15 -0.76 0.46
+20 -1.37 -7.43 0.00 1.92 3.40 0.00 2.73 1.39 0.18 -0.37 -1.87 0.07
+21 -1.30 -7.10 0.00 2.88 5.10 0.00 3.40 1.73 0.09 -0.34 -1.71 0.10
+22 -1.11 -6.06 0.00 3.30 5.85 0.00 3.84 1.95 0.06 -0.24 -1.24 0.23
+23 -1.33 -7.21 0.00 3.28 5.82 0.00 3.79 1.93 0.06 -0.31 -1.56 0.13
+24 -1.66 -9.02 0.00 3.47 6.14 0.00 3.86 1.97 0.06 -0.36 -1.82 0.08
Bidder Target Target EXCL TARP Expansion (Bidder)
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Days CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value
-5 0.30 0.88 0.39 -1.42 -1.96 0.06 -0.40 -0.12 0.91 -0.58 -0.09 0.93
-4 0.90 2.64 0.01 -0.19 -0.27 0.79 -2.10 -0.62 0.54 -1.48 -0.24 0.81
-3 1.25 3.64 0.00 -0.61 -0.84 0.41 -1.74 -0.52 0.61 -0.17 -0.03 0.98
-2 1.13 3.29 0.00 -0.88 -1.21 0.24 -4.32 -1.28 0.21 -2.59 -0.42 0.68
-1 1.48 4.32 0.00 -1.65 -2.28 0.03 -2.20 -0.65 0.52 -3.25 -0.52 0.61
0 4.68 13.68 0.00 -1.07 -1.47 0.15 -9.77 -2.90 0.01 -15.31 -2.45 0.02
+1 4.54 13.26 0.00 -0.96 -1.33 0.19 -11.06 -3.28 0.00 -16.09 -2.58 0.02
+2 4.23 12.37 0.00 0.30 0.41 0.69 -7.78 -2.30 0.03 -8.69 -1.39 0.17
+3 4.36 12.73 0.00 -1.38 -1.90 0.07 -10.39 -3.08 0.00 -9.71 -1.56 0.13
+4 4.36 12.74 0.00 -1.84 -2.54 0.02 -10.47 -3.10 0.00 -7.78 -1.25 0.22
+5 4.20 12.26 0.00 -1.91 -2.65 0.01 -6.37 -1.89 0.07 -2.38 -0.38 0.71
+6 3.91 11.43 0.00 -2.02 -2.80 0.01 -3.94 -1.17 0.25 -4.93 -0.79 0.44
+7 4.01 11.72 0.00 -3.02 -4.18 0.00 -0.97 -0.29 0.78 -1.67 -0.27 0.79
+8 3.96 11.56 0.00 -3.55 -4.91 0.00 -1.61 -0.48 0.64 -4.20 -0.67 0.51
+9 3.88 11.34 0.00 -4.91 -6.79 0.00 -1.99 -0.59 0.56 -4.79 -0.77 0.45
+10 3.82 11.15 0.00 -4.76 -6.59 0.00 -6.71 -1.99 0.06 -3.99 -0.64 0.53
+11 3.83 11.19 0.00 -6.72 -9.30 0.00 -4.87 -1.44 0.16 -3.71 -0.60 0.56
+12 3.80 11.09 0.00 -4.97 -6.87 0.00 -3.83 -1.14 0.27 -5.02 -0.80 0.43
+13 3.90 11.38 0.00 -4.76 -6.58 0.00 -5.93 -1.76 0.09 -8.47 -1.36 0.19
+14 3.90 11.39 0.00 -7.45 -10.30 0.00 -1.92 -0.57 0.57 -2.88 -0.46 0.65
+15 4.20 12.27 0.00 -9.44 -13.05 0.00 -2.39 -0.71 0.48 -6.01 -0.96 0.34
+16 4.04 11.79 0.00 -9.74 -13.47 0.00 -4.40 -1.30 0.20 -8.23 -1.32 0.20
+17 4.17 12.17 0.00 -11.00 -15.22 0.00 -5.76 -1.71 0.10 -9.97 -1.60 0.12
+18 4.13 12.06 0.00 -7.82 -10.81 0.00 -12.24 -3.63 0.00 -16.87 -2.70 0.01
+19 4.23 12.35 0.00 -7.81 -10.80 0.00 -14.30 -4.24 0.00 -21.50 -3.44 0.00
+20 4.42 12.91 0.00 -8.68 -12.01 0.00 -15.59 -4.62 0.00 -20.95 -3.36 0.00
+21 4.59 13.39 0.00 -8.40 -11.61 0.00 -9.06 -2.68 0.01 -13.20 -2.12 0.04
+22 4.90 14.30 0.00 -7.49 -10.35 0.00 -7.86 -2.33 0.03 -10.92 -1.75 0.09
+23 4.79 13.99 0.00 -8.79 -12.16 0.00 -7.25 -2.15 0.04 -10.21 -1.64 0.11
+24 4.85 14.17 0.00 -11.19 -15.48 0.00 -6.20 -1.84 0.08 -9.93 -1.59 0.12
Contraction (Bidder) Contraction (Target) Contraction (Target) EXCL 
TARP
Expansion (Target)
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Table B3.1 Model 3 CAAR, test statistic and p-value during event window (-
5,+5)
Days CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value
-5 -1.08 -5.68 0.00 -0.59 -1.35 0.21 -0.63 -1.42 0.19 -0.82 -4.05 0.00
-4 -1.88 -9.94 0.00 -1.13 -2.56 0.03 -1.04 -2.35 0.04 -1.76 -8.71 0.00
-3 -2.73 -14.41 0.00 -1.66 -3.77 0.00 -1.57 -3.56 0.01 -2.84 -14.06 0.00
-2 -3.82 -20.16 0.00 -2.89 -6.57 0.00 -2.71 -6.15 0.00 -3.91 -19.35 0.00
-1 -4.90 -25.83 0.00 -3.29 -7.48 0.00 -3.47 -7.88 0.00 -4.92 -24.35 0.00
0 -6.41 -33.78 0.00 -2.23 -5.09 0.00 -2.15 -4.89 0.00 -6.72 -33.21 0.00
+1 -6.88 -36.31 0.00 -3.38 -7.70 0.00 -3.27 -7.42 0.00 -7.22 -35.70 0.00
+2 -8.18 -43.14 0.00 -4.04 -9.20 0.00 -3.93 -8.91 0.00 -8.48 -41.92 0.00
+3 -8.74 -46.12 0.00 -5.04 -11.48 0.00 -4.72 -10.71 0.00 -8.94 -44.21 0.00
+4 -9.18 -48.40 0.00 -5.94 -13.52 0.00 -5.55 -12.58 0.00 -9.51 -47.00 0.00
+5 -10.06 -53.06 0.00 -6.47 -14.74 0.00 -6.31 -14.32 0.00 -10.35 -51.16 0.00
Days CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value
-5 -0.45 -1.49 0.17 -2.97 -4.50 0.00 -1.61 -0.64 0.54 -3.14 -0.68 0.52
-4 -0.64 -2.14 0.06 -2.78 -4.21 0.00 -4.52 -1.80 0.11 -6.59 -1.42 0.19
-3 -1.12 -3.75 0.00 -1.93 -2.91 0.02 -5.38 -2.14 0.06 -7.85 -1.69 0.12
-2 -1.99 -6.64 0.00 -3.16 -4.78 0.00 -9.16 -3.64 0.01 -12.82 -2.77 0.02
-1 -2.58 -8.59 0.00 -4.70 -7.11 0.00 -8.25 -3.28 0.01 -16.04 -3.46 0.01
0 -0.12 -0.40 0.70 -4.13 -6.24 0.00 -17.04 -6.77 0.00 -30.66 -6.61 0.00
+1 -1.08 -3.58 0.01 -4.43 -6.70 0.00 -19.54 -7.77 0.00 -34.00 -7.34 0.00
+2 -2.13 -7.09 0.00 -6.00 -9.07 0.00 -17.46 -6.94 0.00 -29.16 -6.29 0.00
+3 -2.72 -9.08 0.00 -7.31 -11.06 0.00 -21.29 -8.46 0.00 -32.73 -7.06 0.00
+4 -3.56 -11.88 0.00 -6.78 -10.25 0.00 -22.59 -8.98 0.00 -33.35 -7.20 0.00
+5 -4.59 -15.29 0.00 -7.97 -12.06 0.00 -19.69 -7.83 0.00 -30.52 -6.58 0.00
Contraction (Bidder) Contraction (Target) Contraction (Target) EXCL TARP
Bidder Target Target EXCL TARP Expansion (Bidder)
Expansion (Target)
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Table B3.2 Model 3 CAAR, test statistic and p-value during event window (-
10,+10)
Days CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value
-10 -1.09 -5.74 0.00 -0.51 -1.41 0.18 -1.08 -3.09 0.01 -1.06 -5.21 0.00
-9 -2.04 -10.71 0.00 -1.11 -3.06 0.01 -1.53 -4.37 0.00 -2.13 -10.49 0.00
-8 -3.27 -17.15 0.00 -0.46 -1.28 0.22 -0.72 -2.06 0.05 -3.32 -16.36 0.00
-7 -4.32 -22.68 0.00 -1.76 -4.88 0.00 -2.33 -6.67 0.00 -4.26 -20.96 0.00
-6 -5.60 -29.39 0.00 -2.86 -7.91 0.00 -3.89 -11.14 0.00 -5.62 -27.65 0.00
-5 -6.71 -35.22 0.00 -3.43 -9.50 0.00 -4.86 -13.92 0.00 -6.48 -31.91 0.00
-4 -7.55 -39.63 0.00 -3.95 -10.92 0.00 -6.22 -17.82 0.00 -7.47 -36.78 0.00
-3 -8.43 -44.25 0.00 -4.46 -12.34 0.00 -7.09 -20.30 0.00 -8.60 -42.32 0.00
-2 -9.56 -50.15 0.00 -5.67 -15.69 0.00 -8.82 -25.28 0.00 -9.71 -47.82 0.00
-1 -10.67 -55.96 0.00 -6.05 -16.74 0.00 -9.56 -27.40 0.00 -10.77 -53.03 0.00
0 -12.21 -64.05 0.00 -4.98 -13.78 0.00 -8.94 -25.62 0.00 -12.61 -62.07 0.00
+1 -12.72 -66.74 0.00 -6.11 -16.90 0.00 -11.34 -32.50 0.00 -13.16 -64.77 0.00
+2 -14.05 -73.71 0.00 -6.75 -18.68 0.00 -11.52 -33.01 0.00 -14.46 -71.20 0.00
+3 -14.65 -76.85 0.00 -7.73 -21.39 0.00 -12.99 -37.22 0.00 -14.97 -73.70 0.00
+4 -15.11 -79.29 0.00 -8.60 -23.82 0.00 -13.87 -39.75 0.00 -15.58 -76.70 0.00
+5 -16.03 -84.10 0.00 -9.12 -25.24 0.00 -14.55 -41.70 0.00 -16.47 -81.07 0.00
+6 -17.03 -89.39 0.00 -9.84 -27.24 0.00 -15.27 -43.76 0.00 -17.44 -85.89 0.00
+7 -18.33 -96.17 0.00 -10.19 -28.21 0.00 -15.58 -44.66 0.00 -18.75 -92.33 0.00
+8 -19.14 -100.44 0.00 -11.14 -30.85 0.00 -16.91 -48.47 0.00 -19.58 -96.42 0.00
+9 -20.50 -107.56 0.00 -12.11 -33.53 0.00 -18.34 -52.56 0.00 -20.77 -102.27 0.00
+10 -21.16 -111.04 0.00 -13.59 -37.63 0.00 -20.42 -58.52 0.00 -21.34 -105.07 0.00
Days CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value
-10 -0.31 -1.04 0.31 -1.34 -2.04 0.06 -1.87 -1.03 0.31 -5.08 -1.72 0.10
-9 -1.35 -4.47 0.00 -1.38 -2.10 0.05 0.58 0.32 0.75 -0.95 -0.32 0.75
-8 -1.66 -5.49 0.00 -2.87 -4.35 0.00 7.89 4.37 0.00 10.07 3.41 0.00
-7 -2.75 -9.14 0.00 -4.80 -7.28 0.00 5.19 2.87 0.01 9.37 3.18 0.00
-6 -3.46 -11.49 0.00 -5.49 -8.31 0.00 1.38 0.77 0.45 5.63 1.91 0.07
-5 -3.91 -12.98 0.00 -8.40 -12.73 0.00 -0.06 -0.03 0.97 2.83 0.96 0.35
-4 -4.11 -13.63 0.00 -8.15 -12.35 0.00 -2.80 -1.55 0.14 -0.29 -0.10 0.92
-3 -4.59 -15.24 0.00 -7.24 -10.96 0.00 -3.49 -1.93 0.07 -1.20 -0.41 0.69
-2 -5.46 -18.12 0.00 -8.41 -12.75 0.00 -7.11 -3.93 0.00 -5.83 -1.98 0.06
-1 -6.05 -20.07 0.00 -9.90 -14.99 0.00 -6.03 -3.34 0.00 -8.71 -2.95 0.01
0 -3.59 -11.92 0.00 -9.26 -14.03 0.00 -14.65 -8.11 0.00 -22.99 -7.79 0.00
+1 -4.55 -15.10 0.00 -9.51 -14.40 0.00 -16.98 -9.40 0.00 -25.99 -8.81 0.00
+2 -5.61 -18.59 0.00 -11.02 -16.69 0.00 -14.73 -8.16 0.00 -20.81 -7.05 0.00
+3 -6.20 -20.58 0.00 -12.27 -18.59 0.00 -18.39 -10.18 0.00 -24.04 -8.15 0.00
+4 -7.05 -23.37 0.00 -11.68 -17.69 0.00 -19.52 -10.80 0.00 -24.32 -8.24 0.00
+5 -8.07 -26.77 0.00 -12.82 -19.42 0.00 -16.45 -9.11 0.00 -21.15 -7.17 0.00
+6 -9.09 -30.16 0.00 -14.03 -21.25 0.00 -15.07 -8.34 0.00 -25.91 -8.78 0.00
+7 -9.77 -32.40 0.00 -15.20 -23.03 0.00 -13.14 -7.27 0.00 -24.87 -8.43 0.00
+8 -10.62 -35.21 0.00 -15.90 -24.09 0.00 -14.82 -8.21 0.00 -29.62 -10.04 0.00
+9 -11.52 -38.21 0.00 -18.49 -28.01 0.00 -16.25 -8.99 0.00 -32.43 -10.99 0.00
+10 -12.39 -41.09 0.00 -19.86 -30.09 0.00 -22.01 -12.18 0.00 -33.85 -11.47 0.00
Contraction (Target) Contraction (Target) EXCL TARP
Bidder Target Target EXCL TARP Expansion (Bidder)
Expansion (Target) Contraction (Bidder)
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Table B3.3 Model 3 CAAR, test statistic and p-value during event window (-
5,+25)
Days CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value
-5 -1.16 -6.30 0.00 -0.57 -1.02 0.32 -0.61 -1.08 0.29 -0.90 -4.56 0.00
-4 -2.04 -11.12 0.00 -1.09 -1.93 0.06 -1.01 -1.78 0.09 -1.92 -9.74 0.00
-3 -2.97 -16.17 0.00 -1.60 -2.83 0.01 -1.52 -2.70 0.01 -3.08 -15.62 0.00
-2 -4.14 -22.53 0.00 -2.81 -4.98 0.00 -2.65 -4.69 0.00 -4.23 -21.45 0.00
-1 -5.30 -28.81 0.00 -3.19 -5.65 0.00 -3.39 -6.01 0.00 -5.32 -26.98 0.00
0 -6.89 -37.45 0.00 -2.12 -3.76 0.00 -2.06 -3.64 0.00 -7.19 -36.47 0.00
+1 -7.45 -40.49 0.00 -3.25 -5.76 0.00 -3.16 -5.59 0.00 -7.78 -39.42 0.00
+2 -8.82 -47.97 0.00 -3.89 -6.90 0.00 -3.80 -6.73 0.00 -9.11 -46.21 0.00
+3 -9.47 -51.48 0.00 -4.88 -8.63 0.00 -4.58 -8.11 0.00 -9.66 -48.96 0.00
+4 -9.98 -54.27 0.00 -5.76 -10.19 0.00 -5.39 -9.54 0.00 -10.30 -52.22 0.00
+5 -10.94 -59.50 0.00 -6.27 -11.10 0.00 -6.14 -10.87 0.00 -11.22 -56.89 0.00
+6 -12.00 -65.24 0.00 -6.99 -12.38 0.00 -7.41 -13.13 0.00 -12.23 -62.02 0.00
+7 -13.34 -72.52 0.00 -7.34 -13.00 0.00 -7.98 -14.13 0.00 -13.58 -68.83 0.00
+8 -14.20 -77.20 0.00 -8.30 -14.69 0.00 -9.09 -16.10 0.00 -14.44 -73.21 0.00
+9 -15.60 -84.84 0.00 -9.27 -16.41 0.00 -10.13 -17.93 0.00 -15.66 -79.41 0.00
+10 -16.31 -88.70 0.00 -10.75 -19.03 0.00 -11.04 -19.55 0.00 -16.26 -82.46 0.00
+11 -17.84 -97.00 0.00 -11.34 -20.09 0.00 -11.91 -21.10 0.00 -17.46 -88.53 0.00
+12 -18.86 -102.54 0.00 -12.11 -21.45 0.00 -12.97 -22.97 0.00 -18.64 -94.50 0.00
+13 -19.82 -107.80 0.00 -13.02 -23.05 0.00 -13.90 -24.62 0.00 -19.61 -99.43 0.00
+14 -21.11 -114.77 0.00 -13.40 -23.73 0.00 -14.49 -25.66 0.00 -20.61 -104.51 0.00
+15 -21.83 -118.71 0.00 -14.02 -24.82 0.00 -15.30 -27.10 0.00 -21.26 -107.77 0.00
+16 -22.77 -123.85 0.00 -15.21 -26.94 0.00 -16.47 -29.16 0.00 -22.28 -112.94 0.00
+17 -23.88 -129.84 0.00 -16.11 -28.53 0.00 -17.37 -30.77 0.00 -23.17 -117.48 0.00
+18 -25.13 -136.64 0.00 -17.80 -31.51 0.00 -18.78 -33.26 0.00 -24.62 -124.82 0.00
+19 -26.27 -142.84 0.00 -18.82 -33.33 0.00 -19.92 -35.28 0.00 -25.89 -131.25 0.00
+20 -27.49 -149.50 0.00 -19.59 -34.69 0.00 -20.54 -36.38 0.00 -27.07 -137.24 0.00
+21 -28.31 -153.93 0.00 -19.50 -34.53 0.00 -20.82 -36.87 0.00 -27.94 -141.67 0.00
+22 -29.05 -157.95 0.00 -19.87 -35.18 0.00 -21.23 -37.59 0.00 -28.64 -145.20 0.00
+23 -30.32 -164.87 0.00 -20.69 -36.64 0.00 -22.16 -39.23 0.00 -29.86 -151.40 0.00
+24 -31.57 -171.66 0.00 -21.36 -37.83 0.00 -23.01 -40.74 0.00 -31.25 -158.44 0.00
Bidder Target Target EXCL TARP Expansion (Bidder)
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Days CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value CAAR t-stat p-Value
-5 -0.39 -1.14 0.26 -3.06 -4.23 0.00 -1.86 -0.55 0.59 -3.70 -0.59 0.56
-4 -0.53 -1.54 0.14 -2.95 -4.08 0.00 -5.03 -1.49 0.15 -7.72 -1.24 0.23
-3 -0.95 -2.78 0.01 -2.18 -3.01 0.01 -6.14 -1.82 0.08 -9.53 -1.53 0.14
-2 -1.76 -5.15 0.00 -3.50 -4.84 0.00 -10.18 -3.02 0.01 -15.07 -2.42 0.02
-1 -2.29 -6.69 0.00 -5.13 -7.09 0.00 -9.52 -2.82 0.01 -18.85 -3.02 0.01
0 0.23 0.66 0.52 -4.63 -6.41 0.00 -18.56 -5.50 0.00 -34.03 -5.45 0.00
+1 -0.67 -1.97 0.06 -5.02 -6.94 0.00 -21.32 -6.32 0.00 -37.94 -6.08 0.00
+2 -1.67 -4.87 0.00 -6.68 -9.23 0.00 -19.49 -5.78 0.00 -33.66 -5.39 0.00
+3 -2.21 -6.44 0.00 -8.07 -11.16 0.00 -23.57 -6.99 0.00 -37.80 -6.06 0.00
+4 -2.99 -8.73 0.00 -7.62 -10.54 0.00 -25.12 -7.45 0.00 -38.98 -6.25 0.00
+5 -3.96 -11.55 0.00 -8.91 -12.32 0.00 -22.48 -6.66 0.00 -36.71 -5.88 0.00
+6 -4.92 -14.36 0.00 -10.26 -14.19 0.00 -21.52 -6.38 0.00 -42.38 -6.79 0.00
+7 -5.53 -16.16 0.00 -11.58 -16.01 0.00 -20.01 -5.93 0.00 -42.24 -6.77 0.00
+8 -6.32 -18.46 0.00 -12.42 -17.17 0.00 -22.12 -6.56 0.00 -47.89 -7.67 0.00
+9 -7.17 -20.93 0.00 -15.15 -20.95 0.00 -23.97 -7.10 0.00 -51.60 -8.27 0.00
+10 -7.98 -23.29 0.00 -16.66 -23.04 0.00 -30.15 -8.94 0.00 -53.92 -8.64 0.00
+11 -8.71 -25.44 0.00 -20.59 -28.47 0.00 -29.77 -8.82 0.00 -56.77 -9.09 0.00
+12 -9.53 -27.83 0.00 -20.46 -28.29 0.00 -30.20 -8.95 0.00 -61.19 -9.80 0.00
+13 -10.05 -29.36 0.00 -21.38 -29.56 0.00 -33.77 -10.01 0.00 -67.76 -10.86 0.00
+14 -10.86 -31.71 0.00 -24.72 -34.18 0.00 -31.22 -9.25 0.00 -65.30 -10.46 0.00
+15 -11.28 -32.95 0.00 -26.04 -36.01 0.00 -33.16 -9.83 0.00 -71.54 -11.46 0.00
+16 -12.15 -35.49 0.00 -26.43 -36.55 0.00 -36.62 -10.85 0.00 -76.88 -12.32 0.00
+17 -12.78 -37.32 0.00 -29.05 -40.17 0.00 -39.45 -11.69 0.00 -81.74 -13.10 0.00
+18 -13.57 -39.62 0.00 -28.85 -39.90 0.00 -47.40 -14.05 0.00 -91.77 -14.70 0.00
+19 -14.24 -41.58 0.00 -29.06 -40.19 0.00 -50.92 -15.09 0.00 -99.51 -15.94 0.00
+20 -14.72 -42.99 0.00 -30.58 -42.29 0.00 -53.68 -15.91 0.00 -102.08 -16.35 0.00
+21 -15.34 -44.81 0.00 -30.97 -42.82 0.00 -48.61 -14.41 0.00 -97.46 -15.61 0.00
+22 -15.72 -45.92 0.00 -32.03 -44.29 0.00 -48.88 -14.49 0.00 -98.30 -15.75 0.00
+23 -16.55 -48.32 0.00 -33.67 -46.56 0.00 -49.73 -14.74 0.00 -100.70 -16.13 0.00
+24 -17.25 -50.39 0.00 -33.89 -46.86 0.00 -50.15 -14.86 0.00 -103.55 -16.59 0.00
Contraction (Target) Contraction (Target) EXCL 
TARP
Expansion (Target) Contraction (Bidder)
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APPENDIX C 
Figure C1: Model 1 
Panel A: Bombay Stock Exchange 
 
Panel B: Euronext Paris 
 
Panel C: NASDAQ 
 
Panel D: New York Stock Exchange 
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Figure C2: Model 2 
Panel A: Bombay Stock Exchange 
 
Panel B: Euronext Paris 
 
Panel C: NASDAQ 
 
Panel D: New York Stock Exchange 
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Figure C3: Model 3 
Panel A: Bombay Stock Exchange 
 
Panel B: Euronext Paris 
 
Panel C: NASDAQ 
 
Panel D: New York Stock Exchange 
 
